Review
Review by: John Bellamy Foster
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Book Reviews

Markets and Moral Regulation: Cultural Change in the European Union.
By Paulette Kurzer. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. xii + 210. $54.95 (cloth); $19.95 (paper).

John Boli
Emory University

What do Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Ireland have in common? They are European deviates. The Nordic countries’ restrictive alcohol policies make the wine-happy French and Italians scratch their heads in wonderment, the Netherlands’ laxness regarding drugs offends righteous sensibilities elsewhere, Ireland’s totally regressive ban on abortion (reflecting the Catholic Church’s medieval view of women) has enraged feminists for decades. Paulette Kurzer, a political scientist at the University of Arizona, raises the interesting questions of how and why, in light of the general pressure toward “harmonization” of policies and structures in the European Union, such deviance has persisted while also undergoing change.

The book’s eight chapters include an introduction that sketches the issues and frames the study; case studies of each of the four countries under consideration; analytical chapters on antialcohol policy in the Nordic countries and drug tolerance in the Netherlands; and a concluding chapter summarizing Kurzer’s understanding, based on the case studies, of moral regulation in the EU. For each case, Kurzer reviews the historical background of the moral regulation regime in some detail and explains both its durability and the forces that have led to change in the regime.

Restrictive alcohol policies, Kurzer shows, are not simply rational responses to serious social problems because neither the Swedes nor the Finns have ever been great alcohol consumers. Rather, strict Nordic control of alcohol stems from “national character” (i.e., in sociological terms, prevailing ontological assumptions about, in this case, the nature and capabilities of the individual): Swedes and Finns believe that, left to their own devices, Swedes and Finns will drink themselves to death. Thus, the state must save them from themselves. Permissiveness with regard to illicit drugs is an instance of Dutch pragmatic tolerance, a mode impelled by the Netherlands’ long history of religious and class factionalism that produced the famous pillarization of Dutch society. For Ireland, Kurzer explains the durability of extreme antiabortion policy as an effect of the central role played by the church in the Irish struggle for independence, both as a rallying source of identity vis-à-vis the English and as the sole organizational presence that could unite the Irish effectively.

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Cultural assumptions, political compromises, and the interests that have organized around them give these moral regimes considerable staying power, but change has come nonetheless. Finland has liberalized and commercialized its alcohol regime, though it retains high prices and a state monopoly on sales of liquor and high-alcohol-content wine and beer. Sweden has loosened import restrictions (begrudgingly, at the insistence of the EU), and the Swedes now broadly favor easier access to beer and wine, though that has not yet come to pass. The Dutch have become less accepting of the easy availability of drugs in their country and have responded to fierce criticism from their neighbors, especially France, by making the drug regime less liberal and putting more resources into suppressing large-scale trafficking. The Irish, meanwhile, have come to favor abortion at least under some circumstances, such as danger to the life of the mother, and women are increasingly likely to seek abortions outside Ireland.

For the most part, Kurzer finds that the main engine of change is not the EU, which is either indifferent (regarding abortion) or largely irrelevant (regarding drugs) to moral issues. Even with respect to Nordic alcohol policies, the EU furrows its brow only about interference with free markets, not moral dangers. Kurzer argues that change has occurred through what she refers to as the “Europeanization” of the peoples of Europe: “No amount of political wriggling can undo the implications of the free movement of people, goods, and services....The agents of change, ironically, are the people or national citizens themselves. Consumers steer the process of change once ongoing exposure to European-oriented values has altered their perceptions and expectations” (p. 175). Thus, Swedes and, especially, Finns have learned that alcohol can be drunk in moderation, so they bridle against the heavy hand of the state. The Dutch, particularly those in border towns, began to see the harmful side of their tolerant drug regime as foreigners flooded in and organized crime began to take advantage of the regime. Europeanization of the Irish, including a decline in religiosity, a wholesale turnabout in attitudes toward premarital sex, the rapid entry of Irish women into the labor force, and a stunning rise in babies born out of wedlock (25% of all births by 1996) made the once-prevailing notion of abortion as “always evil” entirely anachronistic.

This well-written book is carefully documented and richly informative about the policy regimes in the four countries. I am impressed by Kurzer’s grasp of the economic and political contexts surrounding the policy regimes and the complex detail of her historical sketches, which reach back to the 19th century. Thus, in an ethnographic sense the book is highly rewarding. Theoretically it is less strong, perhaps inevitably so, in that Kurzer is hampered by a discipline that rarely addresses the types of problems she investigates here. Most of her explanatory efforts are case-specific patchworks of ideas that, while insightful and revealing, do not add up to a general theoretical contribution. Read the book for the in-
formation it contains and the ideas it evokes; there is much food for
thought here from a scholar who knows European countries and the
European Union well.

*Japan's Economic Dilemma: The Institutional Origins of Prosperity and
Pp. ix+300. $54.95.

Andrew Schrank
*Yale University*

The Japanese economy experienced average growth rates of approxi-
mately 6% per year from 1956 to 1991 and approximately 1% per year
for the following decade. According to Bai Gao, the rise and fall of Japan’s
“economic miracle” demand—note the plural construction—a coherent
explanation. While a number of scholars have traced the high growth
period to trade and industrial policy and the crisis to structural shifts in
the world economy, Gao offers a unified theory of boom and bust and
thereby avoids, in his words, “using different variables to explain different
stages” (p. 7).

Gao’s book can be read as the story of Japanese economic policy, Jap-
anese social policy, and their intersection in the second half of the 20th
century. While a combination of expansionary monetary policy and re-
strictive fiscal policy guaranteed the maintenance of noninflationary
growth in the 1950s and 1960s, it forced the privatization of social pro-
vision as well, for it circumscribed the state’s ability and willingness to
tax and spend. As a result, Japan’s social and political stability came to
depend upon, first, the creation of new jobs through high rates of in-
vestment and export-led growth and, second, the preservation of old jobs
through the defense of “permanent employment” in the large-scale enter-
prise sector, cartelization in the small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME)
sectors, and the regulation of family-owned firms.

What were the long-term consequences? According to Gao, the high-
debt, high-investment, “total employment” system would function more
or less effectively as long as (1) exchange rate risks were mitigated by the
Bretton Woods system and (2) Japanese exports were welcome in the
United States, but it would survive neither the inevitable collapse of
Bretton Woods nor the end of American “asymmetric cooperation” in the
1970s and 1980s. On the one hand, the combination of rigid labor markets
and liberal capital markets would undercut investment in productive
enterprise and open the door to speculation, offshore production, and
deindustrialization. On the other hand, the growth of bilateral trade pres-
sure would force Japan to accept either U.S. exports—and corresponding
risks of job loss—or concessions in others areas as the price of persistent
market closure. The first option, market opening, was rendered unac-
ceptable by the absence of a welfare state, and Japanese policy makers therefore accelerated the onset of speculation, deindustrialization, and crisis by giving in to “other types of international pressures, including liberalizing the banking industry, adopting an expansionary fiscal policy, and engaging in multilateral monetary policy coordination” (pp. 205–6).

Gao makes a significant contribution not only to the political economy of postwar East Asia but to the growing literature on varieties of capitalism by exploring two of the intrinsic dilemmas of capitalist development: the trade-off between coordination (or contractual exchange) and control (or monitoring), and the trade-off between system stability and economic upgrading. While lax monitoring of management (i.e., the system of indirect finance, reciprocal shareholding, etc.) and inflexible labor markets (i.e., the system of total employment) were the price to be paid for massive investment and total employment in the Bretton Woods era, they all but guaranteed the arrival of the “bubble economy” and the onset of crisis when inflexible labor markets prevented export upgrading and financial liberalization allowed speculation and deindustrialization in the 1980s and 1990s.

In other words, Japan’s “welfare society” was rendered dysfunctional by the acceleration of market liberalization in the 1970s and 1980s. The process of job creation in dynamic manufacturing gave way to speculation and offshore production; the process of job preservation was defended at the cost inefficiency and financial deregulation; and the deregulation of finance merely accelerated the flight into unproductive or offshore activity and thereby intensified the underlying crisis.

The argument is convincing and comprehensive—if not incontrovertible—but the book would benefit from a more detailed discussion of both the political underpinnings of government decision making and the relevant historical counterfactuals. After all, the trade-offs Gao describes are intrinsic to capitalism, and “Japan’s economic dilemma” is therefore not necessarily unique to Japan. A better system of monitoring (e.g., Anglo-Saxon “shareholder capitalism”) may have prevented the onset of the bubble economy, but it would in all likelihood have hindered the rapid, investment-led postwar recovery. A flexible labor market may have permitted restructuring and upgrading, but it would have undermined political stability in the 1950s and 1960s. And an effective welfare state would have allowed—but by no means guaranteed—a combination of monitoring and restructuring, but it would have placed a potentially unbearable fiscal burden on a callow Japanese democracy in the immediate aftermath of the occupation.

The intractability (and potential generality) of Japan’s dilemma is at some level Gao’s key point; the fact that it is at times buried amidst the complexity and detail of the text need not detract from the accuracy or the importance of a book that offers valuable insights into the political economies of both the developed and developing worlds.
Since the publication of Mark Granovetter’s *Getting a Job*, sociologists have largely downplayed formal channels in the job-matching process. But Finlay and Coverdill use a wide array of qualitative data on “Southern City” to show that one formal channel—the contingent headhunter or recruiter—now plays a crucial role in the market for low- to mid-level managerial and professional positions. Moreover, this does not mean that job matching is sociologically uninteresting. Rather, this book adds to the growing literature on market intermediaries by documenting how they may creatively solve fundamental tensions and challenges to bring about transactions that would otherwise not be consummated. Through such market making, the headhunter shapes the behavior of market participants and influences the opportunity structure to a degree that demands theoretical attention.

Finlay and Coverdill argue that the contingent headhunter—see Rakesh Khurana’s *Searching for a Corporate Savior: The Irrational Quest for Charismatic CEOs* (Princeton University Press, 2002) for a complementary account of the retained headhunters that place senior executives—is both symptom of and catalyst for the increasingly weak tie between employer and employee in the United States. They distinguish the modern contingent headhunter from the traditional employment agency: whereas the latter was paid by job candidates to find jobs, the former is paid by employers to find job candidates. They also identify several reasons why a hiring manager would use a headhunter rather than the human resources (HR) department. First, headhunters may be more efficient since they are specialists who have developed the skills and the networks needed to find and mobilize suitable candidates. Second, as outsiders who represent the seemingly neutral labor market, headhunters provide cover for hiring managers so they may raid competitors for their employees. Finally, as in Eccles and Whites’ research on transfer pricing, headhunters are often preferred because they allow managers to avoid difficulties that beset coordination with HR.

The heart of the book consists of five chapters, each devoted to a stage of the matchmaking process. First, the headhunter obtains a “job order” from a hiring manager. While headhunters aim to cultivate repeat clients, these are never “embedded” relationships: loyalty between headhunter and hiring manager is quite limited. The next task is to identify and mobilize possible candidates. The detailed description of how headhunters wile their way into an organization, discover, and then “pound away” at a potential candidate’s “wounds” (more or less latent gripes with her current employer) reveals how candidates are constructed as much as
discovered. Indeed, since employers fear that an active job search indicates adverse selection, contingency headhunters specialize in finding and activating candidates who are already happily employed.

Next, the headhunter finds and then coaches candidates so that they satisfy the often unstated criteria used by hiring managers. Headhunters focus on the “hot buttons” or skills that are truly important to the hiring manager and the degree of chemistry between the hiring manager and the employee. Regarding chemistry, headhunters are guided by the mantra that “like hires like” as they screen candidates by guessing the hiring manager’s preference for certain characteristics—principally youth and physical attractiveness. Similar screening processes are at work as headhunters engage in third-party impression management to make sure their candidate gets the job. One headhunter’s observation that “it never helps to wear an ankle bracelet” (p. 153) illustrates how the headhunter shapes candidates into commodities that are more easily assimilated by the labor market.

Finally, the headhunter closes the deal by serving as a buffer between employers and candidates so that she maximizes control over interaction between them. Headhunters also strive to deepen the structural hole between the candidate and the former employer so that there is no turning back. Indeed, perhaps the central paradox of the book is that while the headhunter is hired to secure committed employees she works actively and necessarily to lessen such commitments. It is no surprise then that headhunters are commonly reviled while routinely used.

Finlay and Coverdill’s account is not without weaknesses. For one, it is too headhunter-centric. One should like to have a better sense of how other mechanisms of job search and recruitment—informal networks, in particular—compare in effecting job matches. The book could also include more on whether and how a headhunter may obtain a competitive advantage (while barriers to entry are said to be very low, headhunters are reported to make good money; these things do not usually go together). Finally, there are some threads here that could be the basis for a deeper analysis. In particular, I wonder about some of the myths that operate in this market (e.g., about not hiring from competitors or not recruiting from clients) and why they are openly violated while continuing to receive lip service. These weaknesses are minor, however. I highly recommend Headhunters to anyone who wants to understand contemporary labor markets.

_Dignity at Work_. By Randy Hodson. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. xv+320. $64.95 (cloth); $22.95 (paper).

Dan Clawson
_University of Massachusetts, Amherst_

The most creative and exciting aspect of _Dignity at Work_ is its methodological approach. Randy Hodson and associates have tracked down
every workplace ethnography they could find—108 of them—read them carefully, then coded them on a host of variables.

Ethnographies have a richness and depth missing from survey responses or analyses of objective indicators, based as they are on “actual behaviors in their natural settings, not just secondhand reports and interpretations of behaviors.” That enables them “to see inside the informal groups and relations that constitute a great deal of the real substance of daily life inside formal organizations” (p. 52). Ethnographies typically involve huge amounts of effort—Hodson only included ethnographies based on a minimum of six months of fieldwork—and are able to get at meanings, emotions, and relationships.

But ethnographic studies are also subject to the limitations of any case study approach and thus typically make only limited comparisons. Hodson’s “systematic analysis of ethnographic accounts attempts to combine the strengths of qualitative and quantitative approaches” (p. 271). As a consequence he is able to analyze issues generally missing in quantitative studies, but he does so with a comparative sweep missing from ethnographies.

_Dignity at Work_ has twin centers: a series of quantitative analyses of variables coded from the ethnographies and frequent selections from the ethnographies. The selections both illustrate the coding and give a feel for the depth and complexity of the issue. The wide range of selections also means that _Dignity at Work_ is perhaps the best existing review of the ethnographic literature and can be used to locate the half-dozen ethnographies most appropriate to a reader’s interests and concerns.

Hodson is at pains to emphasize that studying the complete population of ethnographies is not at all the same as covering the population of work sites. If ethnographers are fascinated by the auto industry (as they are), and neglect bookkeepers and secretaries (as they do), Hodson’s analyses will also give disproportionate weight to the auto industry.

Hodson is not as careful to stress a related limitation: it is difficult to disentangle which differences are “real,” based in the work and workers, and which are a result of the characteristics of ethnographers. For example, on several variables—such as degree of resistance to management—there is a statistically significant difference between the United States and the United Kingdom. Hodson believes this represents differences between the workers in the two countries, but it is also possible that U.K. ethnographers are more prone to seek out and report resistance, while U.S. ethnographers are more likely to stress domination, that workers have embraced American ideology. A similar point applies to the relative absence of racial differences; I suspect that few of these works are by black ethnographers, and it is plausible that they would have reported racial differences not identified by white ethnographers.

As the title suggests, the book focuses on workers’ active quest to achieve dignity at work, which Hodson calls “a powerful force in every aspect of social life” (p. 3). The book analyzes four strategies workers
use—resistance, citizenship, the creation of independent meaning systems, and the development of social relations at work—and four challenges they face—mismanagement and abuse, overwork, limits on autonomy, and contradictions of employee involvement.

Hodson concludes that mismanagement and abuse have the strongest effects on working with dignity, not only on worker resistance, but also on a wide range of other variables (p. 249). Worker participation, for example, makes one of its most significant contributions by developing constraints on management that limit abuse and encourage competence (p. 185). Coworker conflict increases when management is abusive (p. 215).

A short review cannot begin to cover the range of topics and variables Hodson systematically studies, but consider one other example: craft work and professionalism (as opposed to bureaucratic organization or supervisory fiat). Both craft work and professionalism are highly related ($P < .001$) to pride in work, peer training, job satisfaction, and other elements of Hodson’s citizenship scale. But craft workers resist management more than any other set of workers, while professionals show less resistance than any other group (p. 168).

Despite the presence of some wonderful selections from ethnographies, I cannot say that *Dignity at Work* is a pleasure to read. It is more like a set of articles than it is like most books. Rather than a central argument to the book as a whole, each chapter has a separate argument, and each involves hypothesis testing using quantitative methods. I sometimes found the book repetitive, as each chapter told you what Hodson would do, told you what he was doing, and then told you what he had done—with the introduction and conclusion repeating it all once more. This is an important book, however, both for its methods and for the range of hypotheses it is able to systematically test.


Eileen Diaz McConnell
Indiana University

*Migration, Transnationalization and Race in a Changing New York* addresses two important questions in contemporary immigration research: (1) Do transnational strategies help or hinder the incorporation of immigrants? and (2) Where do contemporary immigrants fit in the racial and ethnic hierarchy of the United States? This edited book employs a broad range of qualitative approaches (case studies, participant observation, focus groups, and open-ended interviews) and quantitative anal-
yses to explore the lives of Haitians, Dominicans, Salvadorans, Chinese, Puerto Ricans, Indian Americans, Jamaicans, Peruvians, Mexicans, Ecuadorians, and other immigrants in New York City.

In the introductory chapter, Robert C. Smith, Héctor R. Cordero-Guzman, and Ramón Grosfoguel outline the book’s purpose: “We seek to understand the complex processes of assimilation, incorporation, transnationalization and ethnic and racial formation in the context of the city’s changing economy” (p. 1). The introductory chapter justifies the focus on New York City, outlines past relevant research on migration, and describes the limitations of four theoretical frameworks commonly used to understand international immigration: assimilation, social capital, transnationalization, and globalization (world-systems) theory.

The book is divided into two sections. The first section, “Migration and Transnational Processes,” starts with a chapter by Nancy Foner that compares historical and current migration to New York City in order to identify what is truly new about transnationalism. Foner finds that technological advances, the global economy, ethnic pluralism, and binational political participation have changed the everyday practices of contemporary transnational migrants compared to earlier eras. A chapter by Pamela M. Graham documents the Dominican national identity as a mobilizing factor in the “simultaneous incorporation” of Dominicans in the political life of both New York City and the Dominican Republic (p. 88). Sarah Mahler finds that transnationalism dominates the lives of those in El Salvador, yet only punctuates the lives of Salvadorans on Long Island due to factors such as legal status, the cost of airfare, and political conditions in El Salvador.

The second half of the book, “Migration and Socioeconomic Incorporation,” highlights both the heterogeneity and similarity in the immigrant experience in New York City. Lessinger discovers generational differences in the impact of the U.S. racial structure on Indian self-identification, which in turn is associated with transnational practices. Margaret M. Chin’s research shows that Chinese immigrants working in Chinese-owned garment shops are able to activate their coethnic networks for economic gain, while Mexican and Ecuadorian immigrants working for Korean garment employers are unable to do so. The remaining chapters further underscore the influence of social networks on many aspects of immigrant life. Philip Kasinitz and Milton Vickerman point to migrant networks as the primary explanation for the advantaged economic situation and racial reality of Jamaicans vis-à-vis African-Americans. Jennifer Lee confirms that social ties provide Jews and Koreans, but not African-Americans, with access to the social and financial capital that allows them to establish and maintain small businesses.

There are at least four conclusions that can be drawn from the book as a whole. First, the contributors convincingly argue for a more nuanced approach to transnationalism that takes the sociohistorical relationship between the sending and receiving states into account, the role of migrant-
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sending governments in sustaining and encouraging transnational prac-
tices, and the differential impact and experience of transnationalism. Sec-
ond, the chapters verify the influence of nativity; language skills; race;
gender; and social, economic, and political location on the incorporation
of immigrants, irrespective of national origin, that has been documented
by countless others. This finding is further supported by the diversity of
immigrant groups under study and the approaches employed by the con-
tributors. Third, the book highlights the age-old tensions both between
immigrants and the social, economic, and political structures encountered
in the host society and between first and subsequent generations after
arriving in the United States. Finally, the contributions verify the con-
tinued applicability of prominent theories of immigration to understand-
ing the complexity of the immigration experience.

The introduction certainly situates the chapters within immigration
literature; however, a concluding chapter that highlights the unique con-
tributions of the book would have been useful. Most important, the editors
could have incorporated the varying definitions of transnationalism used
by the contributors to confirm or modify the definition developed by Glick
Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-Szanton (Towards a Transnational Perspective
on Migration: Race, Class, Ethnicity and Nationalism Reconsidered [New
York Academy of Sciences, 1992]). Further, in light of the recent growth
of immigrant populations in nontraditional areas of the United States
enumerated in Census Bureau data sources, a discussion of the impli-
cations of the book for other areas of the country would have been useful.
Nevertheless, this book will be invaluable to those searching for a theory-
driven collection of research that records the richness and complexity of
immigration dynamics in a major urban area during a time of substantial
change.

Georges Woke Up Laughing: Long-Distance Nationalism and the Search
for Home. By Nina Glick Schiller and Georges Eugene Fouron. Durham,
N.C.: Duke University Press, 2001. Pp. xii+326. $69.95 (cloth); $19.95
(paper).

Peggy Levitt
Wellesley College and Harvard University

Nina Glick Schiller and Georges Fouron’s book, Georges Woke Up Laugh-
ing: Long-Distance Nationalism and the Search for Home provides a richly
textured, compelling account of Haitian transnational migration. Many
of the people described in this volume live their lives in two or more
nation-states and are embedded in social networks that reach around the
globe. These individuals continue to participate in the economic, social,
political, and religious lives of their homelands even as they settle in new
places. They send resources and remittances that continue to fundamen-
tally shape the life circumstances and possibilities of those who remain behind. By so doing, they call into question long-standing assumptions about the immigrant experience in the United States. We can no longer expect, Glick Schiller and Fouron argue, that immigration signifies an automatic shift in loyalty and involvement from one country to another. Instead, we need new vocabulary and theory to bring to light the nature of the transnational connections sustained by so many contemporary migrants and to help us understand the forms of identity and political action they engage in. This book makes a major contribution to this task.

One particularly useful notion is the idea of long-distance nationalism. This is a claim to belonging to a political community that extends beyond the national borders of the home country. Those who engage in long-distance nationalism are “transborder” citizens who belong to one nation although they may exercise substantive citizenship in more than one state. One factor that gives rise to these kinds of affinities is that states like Haiti are “apparent states,” facing such severe limits to their autonomy that they challenge the idea of sovereignty as it is currently understood. Long-distance nationalism can serve the goals of global financial interests or it can help unite those subordinated by race, gender, and class to call on states to protect their citizens from global economic exploitation and oppression.

Another strength of this volume is its contribution to our understanding of the relationship between gender and transnational migration and the effect of enduring homeland ties on the second generation. Glick Schiller and Fouron argue that Haitian youths as well as second-generation Haitian Americans live increasingly within the same transnational social field and are united by their shared long-distance nationalism. They call for a redefinition of the term “second generation” to include those born in the homeland or the new land(s) because young people are powerfully influenced by the constant flow of social remittances and goods that transmigrants introduce wherever they live. Finally, they illustrate the distinct ways that men and women experience migration due to differences in their mobility, economic independence, and power. They outline gender differences and internal contradictions within Haitian long-distance nationalism, bringing to light the points of tension and the alternative meanings that coexist within the same nationalist rhetoric.

This book also addresses concerns about the methodological tools required to study contemporary migration. Because the social sciences originated in the 19th and 20th centuries as part of the project of creating modern national states, terms like “government,” “organization,” and “citizenship” carry with them embedded nationalist assumptions that impair our capacity to grasp transnational processes. Glick Schiller and Fouron push us to go beyond this methodological nationalism and to find ways to see processes and depict identities that transcend the nation-state. Their analyses are based on careful, in-depth interviews and participant observation in numerous settings in Haiti and the United States. They pur-
posefully reflect on how their own biographies and political leanings shape what they bring to this project, and they do so in an eminently readable and perceptive manner.

Like all good research, this study also raises many questions as well as answers. I mention two here. First, the role of religion is largely absent from this analysis, yet both the Catholic and Protestant churches are also important sites of transnational identity formation and expression among Haitian migrants. As Elizabeth McAlister’s book, *Rara! Voodoo Power and Performance in Haiti and its Diaspora* (University of California, 1992) demonstrates, some Haitians use religious arenas to express allegiance to the Haitian nation, exercising substantive citizenship in two states within religious settings. Other transnational migrants emphasize their membership in transnational religious communities, using their Catholicism or Protestantism to express identities that also transcend the nation-state. Religion, then, constitutes an important, alternative form of transnational belonging that cannot be overlooked.

Second, there is something of a disjuncture between the analyses of individuals and nonstate institutions. We learn a great deal about how migrants and those who stay behind think about themselves, what they do about it, and how the state shapes these dynamics. But when other institutions like hometown associations are mentioned, the individuals who belong to them are largely absent. Again, long-distance nationalism rears its head in many forums. Readers will want to learn more about how migrants think about and make use of these other kinds of institutions.


Thomas D. Hall
*DePauw University*

Denis O’Hearn’s *Atlantic Economy* explains Irish development, or its lack, by examining the complex history of its incorporation into the world-system, especially the Atlantic portion of it. The book proceeds on several levels simultaneously: global, regional, and local. He attends closely to organization of production, organization, class, gender relations, and agency in the interplay of these levels.

O’Hearn discusses Ireland’s role as an “intermediating zone” in the Atlantic economy. This history is “path dependent,” that is, change has cumulative causality: “Changes in one period affect and limit what happens in subsequent periods” (p. 4). Cycles of hegemonic power affect both the way core states penetrate such peripheral areas and the ways local actors resist those penetrations. A shift in hegemonic power often leads
the new hegemon to destroy old forms of control and to build new ones. O’Hearn conceptualizes these processes as “reincorporation” and “reperipheraliation.” Such changes are simultaneously opportunities for a local region to resist incorporation and to improve its position in the global division of labor. O’Hearn clearly embeds this discussion in continuing theoretical conversations about development and underdevelopment.

The analysis proceeds chronologically, beginning with a brief account of early Ireland and its incorporation into various external circuits of trade. He argues that Ireland’s early phase as a “contact” periphery in the 14th–16th centuries sets the conditions for its subsequent “effective” incorporation by England. This both aided England’s drive toward hegemony and Ireland’s first phase of underdevelopment. This was achieved by creating a new ethnoclass division in which land became the salient basis of inequality.

Incorporation into the English economy was a mixed blessing for Ireland. On the one hand it led to industrialization, especially in linen production, but at the cost of eliminating wool production. Linen production, for uniforms and sails, helped the English colonial project in the Americas. On the other hand it limited future industrial development in Ireland because linen production was based on labor intensive activities, undercutting pressures for future improvements in productive efficiency. These changes were supported by specific class fractions in both England and Ireland.

As cotton textile production became a leading sector of English development, linen production was further encouraged in Ireland and cotton production was curtailed. This transformed the countryside into tenant farming, pushed more people from the land, and contributed to starvation and emigration.

The third cycle of industrial transformation moved from import substitution strategies toward export-oriented industrialization. This was a case where formal decolonization was followed by more intensive reincorporation and reperipheralization. As Ireland became more-or-less independent of Britain, it was incorporated into the U.S. Atlantic economy. This time, however, it was not pushed toward agrarian specialization, but dependent industrialization.

During the late 20th century, transnational corporations (TNCs) based in the United States began to locate in Ireland. This export-oriented development led to development of several subsidiary industries. Employment rates rose and prosperity increased, leading some observers to describe Ireland as a “Celtic tiger.” However, these new industries were small and were high-risk suppliers for TNCs. A few fortunes were made, increasing overall inequality within Ireland. The growth that did occur in Ireland was due to its intermediating role between the United States and the European Union. Hence, even this limited development might not be reproduced easily elsewhere. Even if it could, it does not appear to be a path to general development. The Celtic tiger may prove to be
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toothless, since most of the new enterprises are in highly volatile economic industries and generate mainly low-wage employment. Even the high profits recorded in Ireland accrue in large proportion from the internal accounting practices of TNCs.

O’Hearn concludes by comparing cycles of peripheral change. A key difference in the third cycle is that Ireland did not produce goods necessary for American hegemony. Rather, it served as a platform for easy access to Europe by a global bourgeoisie. This has given Ireland some limited opportunities. O’Hearn argues that there is limited possibility of upward mobility in the world-system, but it is largely a matter of timing with respect to cycles of hegemony within the world-system. Some of the other northern European countries benefited from that, but Ireland has not. His broadest conclusion is that more egalitarian social development hinges on changing the global system. Thus, local movements “must take aim at systemic targets, albeit with increasing attention to making coalitions with like-minded movement for change in other localities” (p. 213).

O’Hearn’s *Atlantic Economy* is a solid example of how to overcome a putative neglect of local actors in world-systems analysis. He shows how reincorporation and reperipheralization are inherent in cycles of hegemony. He also demonstrates how development, or its lack, is continually recreated in the interplay of global, regional, and local processes. These are important contributions to our understanding of development, social change, and globalization.


Jan Lin
*Occidental College*

Hollywood is a globalization test case that elucidates the “hollowing out” of American industry. Hollywood films are a strategic American export, cultural commodities that dominate the global media space, while Hollywood’s workforce confronts “runaway production” to competitive locations such as Canada and Australia. Hollywood is less and less a “company town” of studio production facilities and back lots. The Hollywood studios, Aida Hozic reveals in *Hollyworld: Space, Power, and Fantasy in the American Economy*, are now more merchants than manufacturers, involved in financing, merchandising, and branding, rather than the producing of films. Fusing world-system theory and Gramscian interpretations of ideological hegemony, Hozic offers a perceptive and engaging analysis of the global reach of the Hollywood studios in the contemporary era of mass media conglomerates. Along the way, she contributes to our larger understanding of the post-Fordist landscape of American capital-
ism, and on close ties between film production and the U.S. military in the post–Cold War era.

Borrowing the concept of the commodity chain from world-system theory, Hozic applies Gary Gereffi’s notion (*Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism*, edited by Gary Gereffi and Miguel Korzeniewica [Greenwood Press, 1994]) of a shift from producer-driven to buyer-driven commodity chains (derived from analysis of cases like the global garment industry) to the analysis of film production. In the Fordist era, the studios were vertically integrated corporations with headquarters and production facilities sited in Los Angeles, offering regular contracts to stars, writers, and film production staff. This has given way to a post-Fordist flexibly specialized system where studios are units of large, diverse media and entertainment conglomerates. The studios now globally source production of films to independent companies and a more freelance workforce while concentrating home operations on the financing, marketing, and distributing of new films. They manage revenues from rental of film libraries through ancillary media like video, cable or satellite television, and the Internet. “Universal Studios” and “Disney” are film “brand names” owned by giant conglomerates that derive additional revenues through the building of interindustry synergies and the circulating of film/TV images through theme parks, sports, publishing, merchandising, the recording industry, and new digital and telecommunications media.

Hollywood in the studio era was guided by a kind of “social contract” through which worker discipline and film content was censored and regulated by the Hays Office (the Production Code Administration). Hozic importantly perceives that a waning of producer-oriented censorship issues has been balanced by a shift to buyer, or consumer-oriented, marketing and issues such as copyright, royalties, and residuals, extending from ancillary broadcasting, merchandising or licensing of actors’ images or brand names, scripts and screenplays, films, and film libraries. She smartly argues that media conglomerates are becoming “transnational franchises” concerned with emerging intellectual property issues such as black and white film colorization and foreign piracy of American films and programming.

Hozic observes the post–Cold War rapprochement between the U.S. Department of Defense and Hollywood with the conversion of military bases and technology to the entertainment sector. Entertainment has surpassed aerospace as the largest employer in Southern California. With the ascension of special-effects-driven blockbuster films and animation in the film industry, simulation technology for the military has increasingly converged with virtual reality technology for Hollywood. The growing use of advanced technologies in digital film (championed by directors such as George Lucas of *Star Wars* fame) has stimulated a kind of merger between Silicon Valley and Hollywood (dubbed “Siliwood” by Hozic). Alluding to Gramsci, Hozic suggests that this military-entertainment industry cooperation presages a kind of global hegemony whereby
domination is imposed less through coercion and more through ideological persuasion.

Hozic fuses different strands of political-economy and social change theory in her book. This skillful exploration of structure uncovers less agency than might have come through more ethnographic observation or interview. Hozic underplays the significance of recent new labor insurgency (pickets, boycotts, and lobbying) among the writers and actors of Hollywood. There have been strikes over intellectual property issues over residuals (i.e., revenues from actor images and writers copyright). The Film and Television Action Committee has organized demonstrations and lobbied Congress for legislation to help stem runaway production. Hozic also missed the growth of the independent film movement, an unintentional consequence of the shift from the studio era to that of post-Fordist subcontracting. Indie film has recently been buoyed by the arrival of affordable digital camera technology, which has jumpstarted the careers of some maverick directors. Post-Fordist “flexible specialization” must be seen as not just an economic regime or a mode of social regulation, but also a context for artistic product innovation and a terrain for resistance or social change. Still, Hozic offers a well-argued and erudite book exposing Hollywood as a transnational franchise, a branded global conglomerate that converts “swords into ploughshares” in a post–Cold War world through the marriage of ideology and entertainment.


Nick Crossley
University of Manchester

The editors of this collection aim to bring together two areas of study that, they argue, necessarily overlap and yet have been kept separate in the work of most social and cultural analysts; that is, the study of the body or embodiment and the study of clothing and fashion. Most academic studies of fashion, they argue, have managed to trace a succession of styles, tastes, fabrics, and semiotic codes, without examining the body that wears the clothing in question. Conversely, analysts of the body have examined a multitude of ways that the body is moulded and acted upon, without extending this to a detailed consideration of the most obvious of our body projects; namely, the way we dress. The synthesis they aim for, however, is not one that would simply take the body as a passive object, to be draped in accordance with the dictates of the social field. To the contrary, Entwistle in particular is concerned to draw out the role of the active, phenomenological body, viewing dress as a “situated bodily practice.” Clothing, from this point of view, has to be selected, used, and worn, and it has effects upon its wearer. Dressing in particular ways affects our
agency at both a brute physical level and at the level of our subjective experience of self and world. The collection itself consists of 12 chapters, by authors from a range of academic disciplines, divided between three sections. The first section deals with theoretical issues, the second with historical case studies, and the third with contemporary case studies.

The theory section has five chapters. The two strongest papers of this section are by Entwistle, who makes the case for viewing dress as a “situated bodily practice,” and Sweetman, who continues this theme and also adds an interesting and critical review of different sociological attempts to make sense of fashion. Both of these papers make a convincing case for suggesting that there is more on “body dressing” in the sociological literature than one might imagine but also that much remains to be done. Between them they offer strong theoretical support for the rationale of the collection, as outlined above. The other chapters in this section were less persuasive but none failed to offer at least some insights and provocative nuggets.

The history section of the book comprises four papers, beginning with a fascinating account of the history of the use of the mask in 17th- and 18th-century London. The author of this paper, Christoph Heyl, shows how masks have, at different times, assumed different meanings and purposes, linking this in to broader changes in both society and subjectivity, and to more specific issues of, for example, privacy and publicness. The account is convincing and nicely demonstrates certain aspects of the notion of dress as a situated bodily practice, drawing out the significance of this view of dress and demonstrating how this conception can remain connected to a broader view of society and social change. The other papers in this section were also strong, focusing upon Renaissance fashion, the art of men’s tailoring in the early modern period and, “single girl” fashions of the sixties. The former and the latter, in particular, demonstrated in interesting ways how clothing is used to “perform” selfhood and how the selves performed are, in turn, historically located, while the middle chapter was able to show how the tailoring of clothes for men reflects changing views of both masculinity and the body.

The final section of the book contains chapters on the work of Alexander McQueen, queer fashion, and “comfort,” and on a cross-cultural comparison of gender differences in public displays of skin. Of these the latter two were more obviously related to the central themes of the collection, drawing out nicely the different ways that clothing is related simultaneously to an intimate sense of self, a normative order, and to the demand for performances or situated bodily practices (of dress) that link the two.

The collection is, in my view, very impressive. Every paper is well written, refreshing, and interesting. Most are well argued and engage the project of bringing “body” and “dress” together. These authors are doing something new and worthwhile. It is perhaps inevitable in a large interdisciplinary collection that some papers will connect more than others, and for this reason some will have more relevance and appeal to a so-
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ciological audience than others. It is my contention, however, that any sociologist with an interest in either embodiment or fashion will find more than enough of interest here.


Paul Lopes
Tufts University

Anna Szemere’s Up from the Underground joins recent work addressing popular music and politics in the countries of the former Communist Bloc. This body of scholarship stems from the association of “underground” rock and jazz with resistance to communist states whether the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, or Hungary. Similar to work done by Thomas Cushman and Eric Gordy, Szemere’s book addresses the politics of popular music before and after the collapse of these communist states. This ethnography of the rock underground in Hungary attempts to elucidate the specific contexts in which this community experienced and understood music as art, politics, and a way of life. Szemere argues that the comparison of this community before and after the collapse shows a complex interplay of meaning and practice in the production and consumption of art.

Szemere presents an engaging analysis of underground rock in Hungary from the late seventies to the present. She focuses on a relatively small subculture of alienated artists, intelligentsia from what constituted the middle class in Hungary. This community of artists, many schooled in film, theater, and other arts, used the noise of rock in lyrics, music, and performance as a way to express their alienation from official communist culture and a state-monopolized popular music industry. Before the collapse of the Hungarian communist state, Szemere argues, this subculture, through its opposition to a clearly defined antagonist—the communist state and its various apparatuses—made up a cohesive community of shared aesthetic and political values. She then investigates how, with the introduction of a market economy and democratic state, this once-cohesive community begins to disintegrate as its political relevance and shared values dissipate with the rise of political parties, the development of a public sphere, and the realities of a more complex music market.

This work is most informed by the theoretical concerns of Pierre Bourdieu, although Szemere makes use of a number of theorists. This is evident in Szemere’s main question of what artistic autonomy meant both objectively and subjectively in the field of music making in Hungary. Her most compelling theoretical argument is to view the question of autonomy as a socially constructed position specific to a given social context, both
in terms of an artistic field and its broader social and political context. Szemere argues against the assumption that claims of artistic autonomy are merely based on denigrating less legitimate art or merely jockeying within a game whose rules all participants share. Artistic autonomy for the Hungarian underground articulated a general resistance to and alienation from communist society and the communist state—evident in the appeal of this music to a diverse set of audiences, eventually including nascent political organizations like the Federation of Young Democrats. Ironically, in postsocialist Hungary the coherency of the original position of autonomy gradually fell apart with the introduction of a new music market as the class and elitist elements of artistic autonomy within this community became more apparent.

Szemere’s work does suffer from being an insiders view of music and politics in Hungary. Her analysis tends to reflect the self-perceptions and ideological precepts of the small underground rock community, and therefore, fails to take a more critical and comprehensive view of the culture of rock music. This is most evident in her scant attention, and somewhat dismissive stance, on other rock genres, artists, and audiences from punk to the mainstream. This is particularly glaring in her glossing over of the punk and metal scenes of the “ragged crowd,” the large population of disenfranchised and alienated proletarian youth of Hungary. If the one ragged crowd punk group she mentions had lyrics of “lower-class life, of the bleak world of dirty subways, pubs, and the gray blocks of high-rises,” the reader is left wondering why a more serious analysis is not made of the politics of this punk scene (p. 39). And Szemere admits that even mainstream rock artists used double meanings in their officially sanctioned music. She leaves unquestioned the disdain the alternative rock community held towards the values and politics of the mainstream, punk, and metal scenes. I am ignorant of these scenes, but the general reader is left wondering if Szemere could have done a more thorough analysis of the politics of rock in Hungary. The contradictions in the alternative rock intelligentsia’s class position via the more general politics of rock begs for analysis, particularly given their self-perception as the cultural vanguard of Hungary’s own Velvet Revolution.

Criticism aside, Szemere presents a wonderful ethnography of an artistic community. This book certainly deserves the attention of anyone interested in the sociology of art, sociology of music, and recent debates on the politics of popular culture.

Opening Up: Youth Sex Culture and Market Reform in Shanghai. By James Farrer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002. Pp. xii+387. $50.00 (cloth); $19.00 (paper).

Dennis Altman
LaTrobe University

In Mexico, says Carrillo, the night is a time for play, for socializing, and for sex. Hence the expression, *la noche es joven*, that provides the title for his book. *The Night is Young* examines sexual behaviors and attitudes in a country that is conscious of both rapid change and the desire to preserve its sense of national character against the perceived influence of the United States.

Carrillo’s book, based on extensive fieldwork in Guadalajara, focuses on both micro- and macrolevels of analysis in making sense of larger cultural shifts through detailed ethnographic and interview material. While there is some emphasis on male homosexuality—in part a product of the strong focus on HIV prevention—the author has interviewed a large number of Mexicans, women and men (with heterosexual men least willing to participate in interviews). As Carrillo writes: “Women and *homosexuales* or *gays* had a vested interest in talking about sex and gender” (p. 98).

The most fascinating aspect of this extremely interesting book is the changing nature of how his respondents classify and identify with sexual categories, a shift that parallels larger debates about modernity and tradition in Mexico. Carrillo sees the emergence of a new hybridity, which is summed up in one of chapter’s headings: “*mujeres* and *pasivos* but also *gay*.” As is the case in many other societies, the constant confusion between sexuality and gender, caught in the common myth that homosexuals somehow constitute a third sex, is a central script of personal and emotional identities in contemporary Mexico.

As in many other countries, HIV/AIDS becomes the terrain on which the battles for control of sexuality are fought, and Carrillo’s book is valuable in adding to the meager information available in English on the Mexican epidemic. HIV in Mexico is largely found among homosexual men, despite the claims sometimes advanced that outside the First World HIV is essentially a heterosexual issue. Partly for this reason the epidemic became a touchstone, as much as in the United States, for debates about abstinence versus “safe sex,” although the rhetoric used in the two cases is rather different. There is perhaps too much detail here; where Carrillo the educator takes over from Carrillo the analyst, the broader argument risks being lost.
Like Carrillo, James Farrar bases his book on detailed observations in one city—in his case Shanghai—but unlike Carrillo, he concentrates almost exclusively on heterosexual youth. (He also ignores the growing question of HIV infection, which is of increasing concern in China.) Both are interested in how sexuality is negotiated, imagined, discussed, and performed under conditions of social and economic change (the political is less present in Farrar’s book than one might expect), but Farrar is more likely to use the language of literary criticism to make sense of these changes.

Farrar proposes a return to the critic Kenneth Burke and his view of “the sociologist as an ironist, whose aim is to reveal the limits and assumptions of what is taken for granted in culture” (p. 19). In so doing, he is able to free himself from the dominant scripts of contemporary sociological discussion of sexuality and to propose genuinely new ways of understanding how sexuality is shaped through social and economic processes. Thus, he refers to a grammar, a rhetoric, and a dialectic of sexual culture, stressing the extent to which sexuality can be understood as “a broad symbolic field of stories, performances and metaphors.”

This approach is both challenging and at times irritating, for the desire to resuscitate Burke sometimes creates unnecessary tension between the theoretical framework and the material circumstances that at other times Farrar stresses as central. Burke stands behind—perhaps over—the material, so that what others might describe as hybridity or postmodernity Farrar classifies as irony: “A pragmatic response to the aporia of moral choices, a cultivated disinterest and skepticism, not unrelated to the ‘cool’ cultivated by urban youth in response to the performance demands of romance” (p. 148). “Cool” is not a term usually associated with contemporary China, and it comes as welcome relief from more predictable analyses.

While the richness of the observation makes Opening Up a delight to read, it is too long for a book that defines its parameters fairly tightly. As Farrar himself acknowledges, “Commercial sex and hostess bars, in which I did not participate for ethical and financial reasons, take up a far smaller place in my account than they might have, especially given my emphasis on the ‘money motive’ in Shanghai’s culture” (p. 330). This might be seen as the dilemma of ethnographic method: central issues are not dealt with if they are not amenable to fieldwork. Carrillo, too, says virtually nothing about sex work, although in both cases the relationship between sex and money is worth exploration. One is struck by a strange silence here, perhaps a mix of prudery and feminist correctness, which is striking given the larger contexts both authors write about so well.

Both authors constantly confront the ways in which global capitalism is remaking the ways in which people can and do imagine their sexual selves. “There is a spectre haunting Shanghai” writes Farrar, “the spectre of capitalism.” How young Chinese adjust to this is the underlying theme of his book, and if he emphasizes the consumer and the player, it is a
reminder that these roles are only available under certain material conditions associated with industrialization and urbanization.

Reading these two books together, one is struck by certain similarities in what seem to be very different cultural and historical settings; the comparison allows one to speculate on the limited responses available to changing socioeconomic conditions. Many of the strategies available to women and men in Guadalajara are echoed in Shanghai, not, I would argue, because of globalized models of behavior but because of similar material circumstances. (There are of course significant differences as well, such as much greater acceptance of abortion in Shanghai, which Farrar discusses only in passing.)

I wish Farrar had been a little bolder in his willingness to think about the likely future of China and the interrelationship between economic, political, and sexual change. Like Carrillo’s book (which ends with an invitation to “imagine the future”), Farrar’s ethnographic explorations speak not only of the immediate city, whether Shanghai or Guadalajara, but also of much of the contemporary world. Neither author was ambitious—or hubristic—enough to make claims to the global relevance of their works. It is there nonetheless.


William G. Robbins
Oregon State University

To study a place is to approach some understanding of the dynamic intersection between history and geography, to gain some appreciation for the natural and cultural processes that fashion a people’s definition of themselves. Sociologist David Jacobson argues that for more than three centuries Euro-Americans generated intimate attachments to their landscapes. In the emerging American nation-state, citizens developed moral associations with the land, territorial affinities rooted in republican virtues and nation building. This uneven and contrived narrative attempts to grapple with the moral/historical substance of American citizenship and the related question: “What is happening now as the exclusivity of that moral linkage between people and land becomes ever more attenuated?” (p. 2). Because place had a decided noble resonance that involved a sense of belonging, the author contends that for much of American history it gave citizens a firm sense of place and identity in a larger world. In more recent times, the drop in political participation to an all-time low suggests that the old moral tie between people and the land has become much more tenuous.

If there is a magical beginning to the new nation, Jacobson argues, it would be rooted in New England Puritanism where one finds the almost
sacred and imagined joining of people with a common landscape. Puritanism provides the link between the Protestant Reformation and the settlement of Protestants in the new world, a thesis that the author pursues through lengthy quotations from Puritan tracts, including the Mayflower Compact of 1620. Puritans, according to the author, did not engage in a racist grab of Indian land, nor did they define native people in racial terms. In their quest to establish the redemptive “City upon the Hill,” Puritans joined people with land in a sacred covenant. In establishing their New England settlements, Puritans were “less prone to forcibly acquiring Native American lands than their fellow compatriots along the mid-Atlantic coast” (p. 57). And although Puritan influences declined with the approach of the American Revolution, the author contends that certain Puritan principles found their way into 19th-century Indian policy, especially the notion that quasi sovereign reservations provided bounded zones where native people could adjust and sustain themselves.

If there is a single scholar who firmly linked American identity to its vast spacial geography, that person would be Frederick Jackson Turner, the nation’s most influential historian for most of the 20th century. Turner’s emphasis on the importance of the frontier in shaping democratic institutions and values and in promoting American individualism, Jacobson declares, contributed mightily to “the forming of a national identity” (p. 96). He quotes Turner at length to underscore the influence that westward expansion played “in the nationalization of American identity” (p. 97). None of the more recent scholarship that is sharply critical of works by Turner, however, are cited in the endnotes. And therein lies the very conservative and problematic thesis developed in this book.

*Place and Belonging in America* advances an argument that links the falling off in civic engagement in recent years with a decline in people’s sense of nationhood and their associations and ties to particular places. In lieu of those old civic bonds, Jacobson sees the emergence of borderless worlds, internationally acknowledged human rights, privatized “public” spaces, and the unraveling of a sense of citizenship, in brief, a retreat from an older and more moral nation. The public square no longer serves as the metaphorical center of our patriotic attachment; rather, “private and often vicarious forms of community” (p. 165) such as that found in shopping centers, airports, and other privatized public gathering places provide a surrogate for the old town square. In the process, America appears to have lost its collective sense of self with the expansion of suburbs, the emergence of multiculturalism, and the very “denationalization” of the state itself with the demise of the idea that citizenship is associated with assimilation. Attachment to a broad array of “virtual” communities has replaced the old relationship between people and their landscapes.

For scholars who adhere to principles of historical materialism, this book presents difficulties. The author’s selective use of quotations and paraphrasing ranges across the entire spectrum of written literature with

Vicky Randall
Essex University

In this meticulous study, the authors use survey data associated with the 1990 Citizen Participation Study to examine the reasons for the continuing if modest gender gap in political participation rates in the United States. Providing a systematic and luminously clear explanation of their reasoning and methodology as they go along, they raise a series of questions important for feminists and political scientists alike. Their provisional answers will be an extremely useful reference point and in some cases are surprising and thought provoking.

The methodological core of the study is a quantitative analysis of survey data. In addition to a pilot and the 2,517 interviews conducted for the main sample survey, the authors make use of a smaller number of follow-up telephone interviews. On the one hand, the authors defend this method because they claim it “lets the silent speak,” giving a voice to groups like lone mothers who would otherwise not be heard. On the other hand, by providing information about the context, and in particular about institutional settings, they seek to anticipate the criticism that in such surveys the meaning of people’s answers may not be properly understood or interpreted. Clearly, objections can be raised to any given method of empirical analysis, but it must still be eminently worthwhile to test our commonsense assumptions, or prejudices, about categories of people against the perceptions, however subjective, of a systematically selected sample of those people themselves.

The authors begin by establishing the existence of the participation gender gap. Taking note of longstanding criticisms of authors like myself that in this context political scientists have tended to define political participation too narrowly, they include a number of less formal activities but still record a modest gap in all cases except participation in political
demonstrations (where numbers are low all around). The gap is wider when it comes to psychological involvement in politics.

To explain these differences, the authors seek to identify not only the factors most likely to encourage or deter political participation but how men and women differentially gain access to these factors in nonpolitical institutional settings. Responding in part to arguments about the socially constructed and variable nature of gender difference, they also explore differences in the way these processes work within and between the main “racial” groups—whites, African-Americans, and Latinos.

The study generates too rich an array of findings to summarize here. It confirms the contribution of educational attainment and workforce participation to explanations of the gender gap (and this holds for the different racial groups as well). Picking up on feminist intuition concerning the likely “private” roots of public gender inequalities, it explores the impact of the home, both that which people are brought up in and that which they in turn create for themselves as adults. One frequent assumption the authors call into question is that home-based mothers play a vital role in the voluntary sphere. In fact working mothers are more active across the board—in politics, the community, and in charitable and youth-oriented organizations: the only case where the expectation is fulfilled is concerning college-educated mothers’ participation in youth organizations like the PTA or Boy Scouts.

The study examines the implications for participation of egalitarian attitudes and practices in the home. It finds that for both husbands and wives feeling autonomous in making domestic decisions is positively associated with political activity, but other aspects of family hierarchy have no measurable effect. In particular it challenges the expectation that husbands will have more time free for participation than wives: although wives spend longer on domestic tasks, husbands, on average, spend longer at their paid work. What the study could also have addressed, however, is the kind of free time available. Other research suggests that part of the difficulty for wives, or at least mothers, is that the incidence of free time is neither predictable nor controllable.

But perhaps the most suggestive finding, from a feminist perspective, comes toward the end of the study, when the authors, specifically concerned with explaining the gender gap in psychological involvement with politics, turn the causal flow around and ask what the impact on involvement would be if there were more women in top political posts. Comparing findings for different states, they report a strong association (for women, not for men) between a measure of the density of women in visible political positions and several indicators of psychological involvement with politics. Besides nicely suggesting an inversion of the title—the public roots of private or at least individual action—this is a finding that could provide a valuable new argument for those of us seeking to defend the need for increasing women’s political representation against the simultaneous incursions of old-style liberals and poststructural purists.
One of the most important theoretical innovations in recent sociology of science and technology is the rejection of the a priori distinction between "the social" and "the technical." The extension of constructivism (specifically the version developed in the sociology of scientific knowledge—SSK) to technology studies has demonstrated that the distinction between the social and technical is constructed in the processes of technological innovation and stabilization. Earlier studies of technology, whether cognitivist or materialist, tended toward technological determinism—technologies were adopted because they "worked," either because of the demands of rational (or economic) design or the constraints of material possibility. More recent research suggests, however, that the question of what works is itself subject to complex social negotiations and struggles.

A focus on "systems" and "networks" composed of human and nonhuman elements has led to the conceptualization of the "sociotechnical," the intertwining of social and technical elements in elaborate ensembles of beliefs, practices, and material forms. The methodological injunction is that sociologists should study the processes whereby the social and technical are discursively purified and set in opposition to each other even while they are ontologically integrated in powerful sociotechnical networks and systems. The approach comes in a number of varieties: heterogeneous systems analyses (Thomas Hughes), the "social shaping of technology" (Donald MacKenzie), the "social construction of technology" (Trevor Pinch and Wiebe Bijker), and "actor-network theory" (Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, and John Law).

Rather than placing all the agency on the human side of the equation, Latour suggests that we conceive of both humans and nonhumans as "actants." Nonhumans gain agency within actor-networks when they are "translated" in a manner that aligns them with particular interests. Actor-networks gain power in the competitive world of technoscience when they successfully overcome the resistance of people and things by translating and enrolling them into the network. It is in this context that the epistemic battles about what "works" and what is "real" are fought out. From this perspective, sociologists have empirically demonstrated that it is not necessarily the dictates of reason, design, efficiency, or material constraint that determines outcomes in technological and technoscientific controversies. Rather, it is the successful alignment of epistemic positions within powerful actor-networks.

Professor Mort’s book is a contribution to this broad literature, though it is not clear which particular variety she endorses. Empirically focused
on the development of the Trident nuclear submarine, the book investigates the “enrollment of people, knowledge and machines” in a powerful sociotechnical network. Based on field and archival research, it reveals the struggles and vicissitudes of the development of Britain’s nuclear submarine program at Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering Ltd. (VSEL), in Barrow, England. The purpose of the study is to “find out how the Trident system became accepted, stabilized, produced, and ‘black-boxed’ in the UK, in such a way that it has now taken on the appearance of having fulfilled some kind of [necessary] ‘technological trajectory’” (p. 2). Thus the concern is with the *ordering* rather than the *order* of technological systems (p. 76).

The book is written from the “point of view of labor” (p. 4), a framing that permits Mort to make a number of theoretical contributions to the literature. Her concern with “silences,” “technological roads not taken,” and worker layoffs, brings a critical edge to the concept of “enrollment,” suggesting that “conscription” and “coercion” may be more analytically precise in some instances. The concept of “disenrollment” allows her to analyze how the redundancy of workers (layoffs) and technologies (the shift to defense contracting at the expense of commercial products) shapes the trajectory of technological development.

The book provides an empirically grounded and subtle analysis that draws on theory in a consistent and innovative way, yet Mort’s commitment to actor-network theory sometimes seems tenuous. For instance, she takes the rather rich concept of “heterogeneous engineering” (John Law) and equates it with “management” (p. 46) such that it is no longer clear what theoretical work the term is doing for her. Her theoretical ambiguity is particularly evident in her discussion of workers’ efforts—through the Barrow Alternative Employment Committee (BAEC)—to “build a counter-network” in opposition to defense contracting. She does not, for instance, explain BAEC’s failure to counter the trajectory of the VSEL actor-network by reference to the fact that BAEC was not and could not be an actor-network in the sociotechnical studies sense of the term. The reason is that while the workers had technical arguments and could negotiate the social, political, and technical discourse, they had no material technologies in their network. To be sure, they worked with and designed the technologies, but this was because they were actants in the VSEL network; it does not imply that those technologies were part of the BAEC counternetwork. BAEC was largely a purely human network—a social group in the traditional sense.

Recognizing this fact might have formed the basis for a critique of actor-network theory that emphasized the way particular actors exercise *control* within the legal framework of the capitalist state. Such a critique could add to actor-network theory by demonstrating how the macro-structures of governed capitalism create asymmetrical forms of power within sociotechnical networks. Not only could it be shown that some human actants have more agency than others within the network (because of the
structure of the institutional environment in which the network is embedded, but that those same human actants have more agency than their nonhuman counterparts.

Nonetheless, Mort’s book is an important and timely contribution to the sociology of science and technology. It will be of interest to a wide range of researchers in these and other fields (such as labor history and the sociology of work). Though it does not explicitly engage with the new institutionalism, I found myself reflecting on the many potential points of contact the book makes with this literature and on the possibilities it presents for a fruitful theoretical dialogue that could benefit both literatures.


Thomas F. Gieryn
Indiana University

Perhaps you remember the “great rationality debate,” provoked by anthropologist Robin Horton’s 1967 essay “African Traditional Thought and Western Science” (Africa 37:50–71, 155–87), which rekindled arguments over the supposed primitive mind, elicited brickbats from luminaries such as Clifford Geertz, Ernest Gellner, Ian Hacking, Steven Lukes, and Peter Winch, and inspired a younger generation of scholars (like me) to begin studies in the sociology of knowledge. Are modes of thought generally, and in particular logic and reason, human universals or shaped fundamentally by cultural and historical difference? The debate may well have “puffed itself out” (p. 242) by the early 1980s, as Helen Verran suggests, but her return to this problem measures the impact of new theoretical developments since that time. The interventions of feminism, postmodernism, postcolonialism, and—from science studies—actor-network theory and constructivism, have brought about seismic changes in how sociologists think and write about cultural differences in knowing and knowledge.

Verran now teaches science studies at the University of Melbourne, but she draws her empirical materials from earlier experiences as a practicing biochemist and (primarily) as an instructor of science teachers in Nigeria. Her book is refreshingly grounded, in contrast to the lofty philosophical pitch of earlier forms of the debate. Verran becomes a storyteller and gives us vivid details of her ordinary experiences as a teacher of those who teach math to Yoruba children. At the local university, Verran and her students work out a scheme to teach children about measuring length: run a string from your heel to the top of your head, transfer its length to chalkmarks on the floor, and use a meter ruler to find your height. But when the exercise moved to a primary school, the instructor changed the
protocols: a knot was tied where the string reached the top of a child’s head, and the string was wrapped repeatedly around a 10-centimeter-wide piece of cardboard until the knot was reached. Then the students multiplied the number of times the string was wrapped around the card by 10 and measured the leftover bit using calibrations previously marked on the card. Verran is “disconcerted” by this unexpected change of plans, and because that word becomes a leitmotiv, I looked it up: “to upset the self-possession of” may be grammatically awkward, but captures well Verran’s slow realization that she must abandon once-safe understandings of English and African “generalizing logics.”

This episode would seem to display fundamental cultural differences in how people measure: the English prefer to see things as one/many (starting with one, count the many centimeters that add up to height—an “extension”), while the Yoruba prefer to see things as whole/part (each wrap around the cardboard is part of the whole height—a “plurality”). Indeed, Verran starts off her analysis this way, by using this and many other examples of Yoruba and English numbering, measuring, generalizing, and referring to demolish the pretensions of “universalism” (the idea that experiencing the world is essentially the same for all humans, an idea sometimes used by Europeans to show that Africans are inferior because their thinking does not measure up to the standard set, of course, by Europeans). But if the author had stopped her study as a convincing case for relativism, she would not have advanced the rationality debate much beyond where it ended up in the 1980s and, worse, would do little to advance anticolonialism.

Verran “decomposes” her relativist account by revealing its implicit assumptions and translations; she then proposes a different “generative critique,” an “imaginary” that could enable “futures different from pasts” (p. 20). It turns out that relativism mirrors universalism—each is a kind of “foundationism” that depends on a “literalizing” figure that presumes the analytic preexistence of abstract objects, which are then “found” by the investigator, and, by virtue of that exteriority, used as evidence for a theory. The relativist Verran is still the privileged observer and scribe whose expertise alone allows translations from one to another culture (failing to realize that Yoruba people themselves “interpellate” and hybridize the two cultures, and that numbers may be at once multiple and definitively singular). She comes to see that her relativist account has relevance for the arcane agendas of epistemologists but has little use or meaning to Nigerians (and the rest of the world). Verran’s “imaginary” compels her to examine her own “generalizing” practices, which she does beautifully through a deconstruction of her aggregation of unique Yoruba schoolkids into “African logic.” Moreover, she shifts the debate over rationality and relativism from matters of abstract thought to matters of historically contingent, routine, and collective embodied practices. How Yoruba (or English) people count or measure is not something about their
thinking but something that emerges from their “going-on” in face of the inevitable complexities of practical life.

It is disconcerting to find that relativism, an old friend to sociologists, is not so much wrong as profoundly incomplete and politically flawed. Those sociologists who thought that relativism was the solution to the problem of cultural difference—and not its own problem—must read *Science and an African Logic*. In trying to sustain “generative tensions” rather than resolve them with old simplisms, Helen Verran offers an analysis that is less satisfying but more honest. And it might be more useful for settling questions of “How should we live?” (p. 34).


Caroline Hodges Persell
*New York University*

Most studies of education focus on the band of the educational spectrum found in formal K–12 public schools or higher education. By studying adult literacy education provided by U.S. corporations, this book explores more of the educational spectrum. The author’s goal “is to develop a nuanced understanding of the consequences of employer-sponsored education, especially as pertains to literacy” (p. 3), drawing on her interviews with managers in three employment sectors: manufacturing, health care, and services not related to health care. Boyle seeks to “go beyond the issue of effectiveness to understand the program’s contested meaning for the managers, the workers, and the society as a whole” (p. 3).

Boyle begins by discussing the “education ideology—a set of beliefs about education, deeply rooted in the culture of the United States” (p. 6) that sees education as the solution to wide-ranging individual and social problems. Adult literacy education intensifies several social tensions, such as between public and private goals, and the book examines the policy, politics, and philosophies of the adult literacy education profession and the historical involvement of employers in the provision of basic education. The author notes tensions between employers and educators, such as whether the purpose of literacy is employment or liberal education goals, and describes the rationales middle managers offer for literacy education, suggesting that legitimacy may be as important as efficacy for informing their decision. Chapter 4 considers the curriculum, teaching methods, and time available for classes, as well as student and teacher characteristics. Employers exert little direct control over content, and teachers have a fair amount of autonomy within the major constraints set by limited time and money. Much of the workplace literacy effort reaches immigrant, non-English speakers, a feature seldom discussed overtly by managers.
Regarding managers’ perceptions of program outcomes, surprisingly little attention was paid to the efficacy of the programs in terms of measured student learning, underscoring the author’s argument that symbolic rather than instrumental functions of education are more important. Changes in workers’ attitudes (e.g., loyalty and self-esteem) were mentioned most often. Other unacknowledged outcomes include the assimilation of immigrants, the manifestation of employer beneficence, and the shift in responsibility for firm productivity to individuals. The author sees literacy instruction as part of a new employment contract that substitutes such opportunities for job security. Structural economic changes have created a work world with “no guarantees.” While the shrinking number of good jobs is not due to employee illiteracy, ironically, literacy programs seem to place responsibility for “employability” on individuals rather than on organizations or the economy more generally.

Chapter 7 examines the perspective of the middle managers who implement such programs (even though they were not the teachers). The book concludes by developing the interesting and important argument that literacy programs create the appearance of solving social and economic problems, while deflecting attention from the underlying systemic causes in the economy and obscuring noneconomic solutions. Boyle highlights the paradox that providing educational opportunity may improve some individuals’ prospects, while crystallizing the position of illiterate workers at the bottom of the income and status hierarchy of their organizations.

Boyle fulfills her goal of conducting a “debunking” study by critically analyzing the situation and considering both positive and negative consequences for various participants. Her arguments are interesting, but their connection to empirical evidence is more tenuous. There appears to be a limited selection of informants (only middle managers, not workers, teachers, or senior managers). As best I can tell, the original research for the entire book is based on interviews with 24 middle managers.

The chapter on curriculum and pedagogy could be stronger. The managers were asked, “What is the curriculum like?” (p. 74). Little detail is offered about either the content of the curriculum or how the teaching was actually done. Boyle draws on the research literature on adult education more generally, but classroom observations might have enhanced her discussion.

Even though we do not yet have a complete fix on this portion of the educational spectrum, this book clearly shows that it exists and that intriguing and sometimes contradictory things may be happening there. Some connection between the tensions (for example between the allocation and opportunity functions of education) observed in employer-based literacy education and those in other educational venues would have broadened its relevance for sociologists and other scholars of education. The author’s background and strength appears to lie in the sociology of work and labor more than education or stratification. Scholars interested in the

Ed Collom
University of Southern Maine

The number of American parents who choose to home school their children has recently increased dramatically. Even more impressive is the number of organizations that these parents have founded to support this endeavor in various ways. Mitchell L. Stevens's *Kingdom of Children* stands to fill an important void as home schoolers and their organizations have been slighted by both sociologists and social-movement scholars.

This book is extremely well written and thought provoking. The fieldwork spanned 10 years (beginning in 1989) and included 40 interviews with home-schooling parents, visitations to 10 “nationally active” home-schooling organizations, and participant observation in several events. Fundamentally, the book is an analysis of home schoolers’ organizations.

Stevens begins by arguing that “home schooling is, in short, a social movement, with a rich history and an elaborate organizational apparatus” (p. 4). Stevens’s organizational analysis and interviews support the idea that there are essentially two groups of home schoolers. Jane A. Van Galen (in *Home Schooling: Political, Historical, and Pedagogical Perspectives* [Ablex, 1991]) popularized this dichotomy by labeling home schoolers with religious motivations as “ideologues” and the antibureaucratic libertarian group as “pedagogues.” Stevens refers to the former as “believers” or “heaven-based” and the latter as “inclusives” or “earth-based.”

A substantial contribution of Stevens’s research lies with its documentation of the differing forms that the organizations founded by these two groups take. Support organizations of the earth-based group strive to be democratic. Their meetings are loose and informal, and decisions are made by consensus. The organizations of the heaven-based group differ considerably. “Committed to an ideal of godliness, the believers have created a system that is built around leaders and that discourages dissent” (p. 115). With an array of marketed curricular materials and steep dues, the believers’ organizations are also “big business.” “The believers were after authority and control, while the inclusives wanted democracy. The believers were interested in making money and centralizing power, the inclusives in grassroots empowerment” (p. 146).

In the most analytical portion of the book, Stevens examines the two camps’ response to threatening federal legislation. A prominent organi-
zation of the believers launched an intensive campaign that forced the inclusives to react and counter what they saw as a misrepresentation of the home-schooling community. Stevens quickly dismisses resource mobilization and network approaches to social movements, arguing that “we need a cultural explanation” (p. 166). Unfortunately, the analysis is very loose and atheoretical. He argues that the strength of the believers’ campaign is attributable to the acceptance of their national leaders’ authority and the reputation of their hierarchical organizations. The inclusives lacked a shared identity, and their last-minute coalition captured no media attention. Nonetheless, each group was successful, as the amendments offered by both camps ultimately passed.

The major weakness of this book is that social theory is not seriously engaged. Stevens never defines what he considers “social movements” to be. It is a nontrivial issue to argue that home schooling is a social movement. The legislation analysis tells a story that has to do more with “normal” politics and professional lobbying than contentious collective action. Concepts such as political opportunity, collective action frames, and biographical availability should have been engaged to strengthen the analysis.

The book also has some methodological weaknesses. No numerical data are ever presented. Stevens admits that home schooling changed dramatically over the period of his study. Yet we have little sense of the overall number of home schoolers and the relative size of the believers and the inclusives and their organizations over this decade. More specifics about the fieldwork are also needed, such as how rapport was built with a population that has often been skeptical of, if not hostile to, “research.” Using existing organizations as a sampling frame limits this research too. What about those home schoolers who are not affiliated with any “nationally active” organizations?

The contemporary relevance of this book is compromised as Stevens perpetuates a false dichotomy by focusing on the extremes. Had the existing body of research examining why parents home school their children been cited, the diversity of this growing population would be evident. Home schoolers cannot be so neatly divided into earth-based and heaven-based groups. There are a host of “middle grounders” as parents have taken on this responsibility for a variety of reasons. To his credit, Stevens does note: “People who came in during the late 1990s joined a different movement. . . . Home schooling had become a fully institutionalized if still unconventional educational choice” (pp. 195–96).

Despite its limitations, Stevens’s research is commendable, as it gives voice to differing types of home schoolers. This ethnography provides valuable firsthand experience and motivations. Stevens’s work also dispels the “antisocial” myths surrounding home schooling by stressing that it has always been a collective enterprise. *Kingdom of Children* will no doubt play an important role in the much-needed sociological dialogue surrounding home schooling.
In the early 1980s a trans-Atlantic antinuclear movement consisting of millions of protestors emerged seemingly out of nowhere to threaten the prerogatives of power. In Europe this took the form of massive protests against the deployment of Euromissiles—intermediate-range nuclear missiles placed on European soil. In the United States there arose the nuclear freeze movement, aimed at stopping the escalation of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons. It is often claimed that both wings of this trans-Atlantic antinuclear movement failed. The European antimissile movement was unable to prevent the deployment of Pershing 2 and cruise missiles in Europe. Likewise the nuclear freeze movement in the United States did not stop the Reagan administration (its main political target) from escalating its nuclear arms race with the “evil empire.” Proponents of American triumphalism frequently contend that Reagan’s policy of negotiating from strength led to Mikhail Gorbachev’s startling concessions and the end of the Cold War. According to this hegemonic interpretation, all of the efforts of the antinuclear protestors in the West came to naught. The movement did not matter.

In *Why Movements Matter* Steve Breyman adopts a widely different interpretation that centers on the West German peace movement but also examines developments in Britain and the United States. The impact of the antinuclear movement, he contends, was enormous despite its failure to realize its immediate goals. In West Germany the peace movement eventually gained the support of the Social Democratic Party, the nation’s largest political party. It was the mushrooming of the antinuclear movement on both sides of the Atlantic that forced the Reagan administration to enter into the negotiations over intermediate-range nuclear forces. And it was the pressure generated by this movement (by 1983 70% of the West German population were opposed to Euromissile deployment, and more than 80% of the population in the United States backed a nuclear freeze) that fractured the Cold War consensus enabling Gorbachev to pull out of the game and begin the unilateral reductions in nuclear arms that resulted in the unraveling of the Cold War system. Despite the fact that Gorbachev’s actions came several years after the climax of the Western antinuclear movement, they could therefore be seen as a reflection of the larger impact of that movement. Breyman quotes E. P. Thompson, the great British historian and principal spokesperson for European Nuclear Disarmament (END), as saying in 1990, “To our surprise, our own words started to come back to us after 1985—from Moscow. It was Gorbachev who took our lines, who spoke of ridding Europe of nuclear weapons.
‘from the Atlantic to the Urals,’ who proposed a practical agenda for the
dissolution of both blocs, who advocated the withdrawals of Soviet and
U.S. troops behind their borders by the year 2000” (p. 266).

The story that Breyman tells is indeed riveting. The United States and
NATO planned to introduce intermediate-range missiles into Europe to
counter existing Soviet intermediate-range missiles. But the speed of the
Pershing 2s gave NATO the potential to decapitate the Soviet leadership
before they could respond, while the cruise missiles were small enough
to be hidden in a building or a haystack. Hence, the Soviets viewed the
prospective deployment of such missiles as a major escalation. Reagan
and his administration repeatedly declared that a nuclear war was “win-
nable” and that the use of Euromissiles was not unthinkable. Fears in
the West (as well as the East) thus skyrocketed, and the antinuclear move-
ment arose as a major constraint on the administration. Reagan’s two
best-known speeches—his “Evil Empire” and “Star Wars” speeches—were
both delivered as responses to the freeze movement. The shift of the Social
Democratic Party in West Germany from the hegemonic Cold War po-
sition to support for the peace movement was a demonstration of the
movement’s power. The German Greens obtained parliamentary seats for
the first time through their links to antinuclear protests. In the end, though,
the West German parliament supported the deployment of the Eurom-
issiles, which commenced in November 1983.

What makes Breyman’s analysis so persuasive, giving his study a larger
significance for sociologists, is his development, in the last two chapters
of his book, of a theoretical approach for assessing the impact of social
movements. Breyman argues that social movement theories have tended
to emphasize origins rather than outcomes. More important even than
outcome, however, is the impact of movements. The latter is invariably
complex, multifaceted, and cultural. He introduces an eight-variable
framework for assessing impact. All sociologists concerned with social
movements will benefit from examining this model, which explains why
movements almost always matter—even when they appear to have failed.

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*Dancing at Armageddon: Survivalism and Chaos in Modern Times*. By
xii+276. $27.50.

J. William Gibson
*California State University, Long Beach*

After a decade of ethnographic fieldwork amidst the survivalists of the
Pacific Northwest, Richard Mitchell has finally returned home and pre-
sented us with his reflections on a long, strange trip. Clearly skilled in
the classics of European social theory and philosophy, Mitchell approaches
the survivalist movement as a response to the iron cages of modernity.
American Journal of Sociology

He strongly agrees with Simmel's contention that the "deepest problem of modern life" concerns the "attempts of the individual to maintain independence . . . of his existence against the sovereign powers of society, against the weight of historical heritage, and the external culture and technique of life" (quoted on p. 6).

Mitchell argues that the survivalists of the 1980s and 1990s rejected modern society and culture as too restrictive, limiting their role to that of passive consumers of the mass media and marketing. Instead, survivalists asked, "Who shall create?" and answered that they would take responsibility for forging their own culture. "It is the imaginative work of culture crafting, not the artifacts of culture to which survivalists are attracted," says Mitchell (p. 9). More simply put, in his years of playing war games, attending group meetings, and schmoozing with folks in camouflage, Mitchell found that they all loved a good story, whether it was about the forthcoming collapse of society or a rant praising good guns and damning bad ones.

Survivalists also demonstrated a deep fascination with what Mitchell, citing Heidegger, calls techne. The concept refers to "living knowledge, for understanding, being entirely at home with something, enjoying a sense of familiar expertise." Mitchell argues that the survivalists' endless fascination with guns and chainsaws, two-way radios, police scanners, camping gear of all sorts, dehydrated food, home gardens, and all sorts of other tools stems from yearnings to exercise techne, to make their own culture and place. The opportunity to exercise these abilities is connected to the forthcoming social breakdown. "Crisis, chaos, and even doomsday scenarios have latent allure," says Mitchell, because "along with uncertainty and danger come opportunities for creative engagement in contests with the fateful forces of a new age" (p. 11).

The characters in *Dancing at Armageddon* come alive; Mitchell is careful to always respect their humanity and avoid dismissive caricatures. At the same time, Mitchell himself frequently appears in the text. He cries after attending William Potter Gale's seminar on how to kill Jews and blacks, complete with detailed exercises in throat-cutting and garroting. "How can we hate each other so much for so little, for a sliver of faith or a shade of skin or our way of making words?" he asks (p. 134). Mitchell concludes from his years of emotionally draining work that "the social scientist joins Camus's list: the artist, writer, dramatist, and other interpreters of culture who discover they are as much defined by their work as it is defined by them" (p. 209).

But for all the charms of his you-are-there approach, Mitchell is not always persuasive. In his many excellent reports from the field, Mitchell never shows survivalists demonstrating any serious techne or craft skill. An accomplished mountaineer, he notes with consternation that no one listened to his class on land navigation skills even though it was the centerpiece of an entire weekend training camp. Rather than real craft skill, what is demonstrated is consumerism.
There are also troubling questions of who is the enemy to survivalists and what does violence mean to them. The book begins with one of his contacts, a man named Hank, distinguishing himself and his group from James Oliver Huberty’s 1984 attack on a McDonald’s in San Diego. But pages later, Hank delivers an “intelligence report” to his group detailing the imminent invasion of the United States by thousands of Cuban operatives, implying the Mt. Rainer Rangers are headed to battle.

A similar disjunction occurs when Mitchell discusses William Potter Gale’s gruesome speeches and lessons. “Following Gale’s tirades seminar participants did not babble in tongues or run amuck but offered insights into dietary conduct and household electrical systems, tax regulations, and the history of science” (p. 159). No doubt that is what he observed, but their silence does not mean the speech and training in how to kill meant nothing to the audience.

Lastly, it would have been helpful if Mitchell had more explicitly connected his decade of fieldwork among survivalists to broader historical changes, such as the Vietnam War in the 1960s, the feminist movement of the 1970s, the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, and McVeigh’s bombing in Oklahoma City in 1995. We do not get the big picture of why the movement dissolved, or even a sketchy timeline.

Maybe Mitchell will answer these questions once he has had a good rest from the subject. And still, regardless of these questions, Dancing at Armageddon is great ethnography and warrants our respect.

_Book Reviews_

_AntiFeminism and Family Terrorism: A Critical Feminist Perspective._ By Rhonda Hammer. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002. Pp. xi+237. $70.00 (cloth); $25.95 (paper).

Lisa D. Brush
University of Pittsburgh

Rhonda Hammer reinforces my fear that instead of being the radical heart, violence against women has become the Achilles’ heel of contemporary feminism. Hammer explores the reasons why this is so. Violence against women is complex. Controversies rage over methods and numbers, variation and explanation, harm and remedy. Most important, feminists’ focus on violence against women has been the spark igniting firestorms of criticism of feminist goals, rhetoric, and politics. Hammer provides the first book-length treatment of this dimension of the antifeminist backlash.

Hammer spends half her book setting out and characterizing antifeminism, and half rebutting and explaining it. Throughout, she emphasizes the violence (physical, sexual, emotional) against women, children, and the elderly that occurs in families. Hammer names this abuse “family terrorism.” Hammer’s documentation of family terrorism around the
world, and her discussion of feminist analyses of its causes and consequences, form the core of her response to the trashing of feminism.

Hammer critiques what she calls “media-promoted versions of anti-, post-, and pseudofeminism” (p. 6) written by “feminist impersonators” (p. 23) such as Naomi Wolf and Rene Denfeld. Hammer takes these women’s rhetoric seriously as antifeminist propaganda. She documents their attacks and assesses their motives, interests, and resources, including their reliance on right-wing foundations. Hammer’s account nicely distinguishes among the arguments, evidence, targets, strategies, and successes of the diverse antifeminist screeds published in the popular press. Helpfully, she also traces a common thread from the preppy English major Katie Roiphe to the aging poseur Camille Paglia. Hammer considers them all “collaborators,” in a sense drawn specifically from anti- and post-colonial theories. Antifeminist women share a willingness to be used by the mainstream media to portray the U.S. women’s movement as moribund and moralistic. They share, as well, a distinct eagerness to discredit serious discussion of the violent enforcement of women’s subordination.

The two big ideas of Hammer’s book—coining the term “family terrorism” and applying the concepts of “collaborator” and “colonization” to gender politics and antifeminism—are both interesting. I heartily agree with her main points. Women lose when feminist theories and movements neglect violence and abuse. Neglecting these subjects is tempting for many reasons—the stories of victims and survivors are disturbing. Violence and abuse are hard to measure and harder to explain, especially if the idea is to avoid exclusively biological or psychopathological models. Battering and rape render all women vulnerable, yet are varied and structured by race and ethnicity, class, sexuality, disability, and nation. Campaigns to end violence against women strike at the heart of male dominance in a different and perhaps more threatening way than policy debates over equal pay or child care. When antifeminists attack research on violence against women and dismiss organizing to stop rape and battering, they are indeed doing the work of the patriarchy. Hammer creatively extends the metaphor of colonialism and the critiques of feminists of color to understand these collaborators.

The term “family terrorism” erases the gender specificity of battering, incest, and marital rape, mostly perpetrated by men against women and girls. The expression is thus a peculiar choice. More problematic, Hammer’s account of the external assaults on feminism omits the attack—specifically on issues of violence against women—from within. Women calling themselves feminists disagree vehemently with other feminists’ analyses of prostitution and pornography as violence against women, for example. Self-identified feminist analysts find the empirical complexity of women’s realities so daunting that they are unwilling to condemn sexualized exploitation and harm. The fashionable feminist obsession with “resistance” exaggerates women’s agency in unlikely places (e.g., strip clubs and Free Trade Zones). Claiming solidarity with “bad
girls," some feminists mount attacks on the moralism and social control they see in other feminists' campaigns against the traffic in women —attacks indistinguishable in their content and effects from those of the “pseudofeminists” Hammer critiques. Much social science research on gender focuses on conflicts between earning and caring rather than battering, rape, and other abuse. In the context of the backlash against feminism, it seems strategic to focus on harms to children and the elderly instead of harms to women qua women. Hammer’s use of the term family terrorism and her feminist appropriation of critiques of colonialism are of only modest help in countering the widespread dismissal of feminist efforts to end violence against women.

Misogyny is not genetic, and it is not all that surprising. Hammer provides a complex account of the fact that women can be opportunists and pimps. The argument could be tighter. The misquotes and occasional logical slips should have been caught in production. Hammer might have cited previous accounts of popular antifeminism (e.g., Patrice McDermott’s and Deborah Rhode’s articles in the 1995 volume 20 of Signs; my own 1997 essay in Violence against Women 3:237–56). Overall, Hammer has done feminists an important service by providing this sustained analysis of antifeminism.


Karen Beckwith
College of Wooster

“Is Irish feminism an exception in the Western context?” (p. 33). To answer this question, Linda Connolly focuses on the Irish women’s movement, inclusively understood, encompassing women’s rights activists, radical feminists autonomously organized, liberal feminists, and contemporary women’s community groups—all joined by their common commitment to empowering Irish women and to improving their legal, economic, and cultural status. Connolly asserts that the Irish women’s movement is of long standing and can be understood as traversing an early women’s rights and suffrage component, a period of feminist abeyance, radical and liberal feminist reemergence in the early 1970s, and a post-1980s reassessment and shift in strategy, especially in response to antifeminist opposing movements. Based on archival research, secondary analysis, field research, and interviews of feminist activists, The Irish Women’s Movement is a rich, detailed, and well-documented investigation of Irish women’s activism along feminist lines across the last century.

Two of Connolly’s major contributions are her discussion of the Irish women’s movement in abeyance and her analysis of Irish feminism since the 1970s, grounded in an appreciation (and elucidation) of the move-
ment’s prior history. Between limited suffrage for women in 1918 and the emergence of a second wave of Irish feminism in the late 1960s, apparently conservative women’s organizations sustained feminist activists and ideas and protected their organizational structures. Connolly employs an underdeveloped political opportunity model to discuss the successes and continuities of the Irish Countrywomen’s Association, the Irish Housewives’ Association, and the Women’s Social and Progressive League, presenting an abeyance trajectory that permits the reactivation of these organizations and their eventual cooperation with the more radical feminist groups of the Irish women’s movement’s second wave.

In Part 2, Connolly carefully documents how the second wave of Irish feminism, a minority movement in the late 1960s, nonetheless emerged quickly, made and benefited from transnational feminist contacts, developed a radical branch with autonomous and disruptive strategies, supported a liberal branch that sustained civil rights and policy advances, and encouraged conservative women’s organizations, such as the Irish Countrywomen’s Association, to support explicitly feminist goals. In a nation where women have been severely underrepresented in national legislative office, where laws precluding women’s jury duty and married women’s employment in the civil service persisted into the mid-1970s, where contraception was illegal until 1974, and where divorce is unavailable and abortion continues to be criminalized, Irish feminists have nonetheless made impressive gains (see app. 5 for a range of social welfare policy and civil rights legislation; see app. 6 for feminist progress regarding abortion and contraception; in general, readers will benefit from the book’s extensive appendices and endnotes).

Irish feminists have faced a daunting lack of political opportunity: strong, well-funded opposing movements; minority public opinion support on issues such as divorce and abortion; a relatively weak social-movement sector; high unemployment, especially among women; no conducive political party support; and European Union willingness to exempt Ireland from any uniform EU pro-abortion policy. In short, Irish feminists have been presented with a hostile, gendered opportunity structure. In this regard, Connolly has missed an opportunity herself: to critique political opportunity structure theory for its inability to predict and to explain the successes of Irish feminism.

What is most striking about Connolly’s analysis is that the development of Irish feminism as a social movement shares the pattern of feminist development in most Western nations. Women’s suffrage motivated the first women’s movements in the 20th century, movements that were in abeyance from roughly 1920 to 1960, during which time feminists sustained organizational structures or were active in a “parallel network of women’s groups, mainly engaged in production and social services” (p. 58). A second feminist wave emerged in the late 1960s–early 1970s, dominated by radical feminist and liberal feminist components of a pluralistic and contentious overarching women’s movement, marked by competing
strategies of autonomy and state-involvement. Women’s employment and social welfare protections, availability of contraceptives, liberalization of divorce and abortion law, and antidiscrimination policies across a wide range of issues were the focus of feminist movements in, for example, Canada, Germany, Spain, and the United States. As second-wave feminist movements matured, their issues and organizations extended, involving multiple networks and a proliferation of groups that worked, increasingly, in coalition around shared issues. Throughout the 1980s, liberal feminism appeared ascendant, as feminist movements focused on mainstream and electoral politics (see, e.g., Britain, France, Italy). The pattern of Irish feminist movement development shares a common template with feminist movements in West Europe and North America. Whether the continued trajectory that Connolly posits for the Irish women’s movement—of a diffused women’s community-based activism—persists remains to be seen . . . and analyzed.

Empowering Women: Land and Property Rights in Latin America. By Carmen Diana Deere and Magdalena León. Pittsburgh, Penn.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001. Pp. xxv+486. $55.00 (cloth); $24.95 (paper).

Helen I. Safa
University of Florida

With this comprehensive study of women’s land rights in Latin America, Carmen Diana Deere and Magdalena León continue their groundbreaking collaborative work, begun in the 1970s, on rural women in the region. Deere, a professor of economics at the University of Massachusetts—Amherst, and León, a sociologist at the National University of Colombia, could serve as a model of collaborative research between U.S. and Latin American scholars; their work demonstrates how fruitful such an alliance can be.

Together, Deere and León collected and analyzed data on women’s legal access to land under property law in 12 different countries in Latin America and contrast these with women’s actual ownership of land and control of property through case studies in each of these countries. As might be expected, the gap between legal and actual sexual equality in land rights is substantial, due primarily to continuing male privilege in inheritance, in state programs of land distribution and titling, and in land markets. What is perhaps most surprising is the gains Latin American women have made under neoliberalism, which certainly has not stressed gender equality. Whereas previous agrarian reforms had centered on the male household head as the focus of state land-distribution and titling efforts, this concept was virtually eliminated by constitutional reforms establishing formal gender equality and new civil codes legally recognizing dual-headed households, the property rights of women in consensual un-
ions, and civil divorce, as well as national plans to achieve greater gender equality. But as the authors point out, guaranteeing women’s formal land rights is insufficient without concrete mechanisms of inclusion such as mandatory joint titling to couples, already adopted in several Latin American countries but still hotly contested. Mexico really reversed itself on women’s land rights in 1992, when it enacted changes to Article 27 of the constitution paving the way for the privatization of the ejidos (the collective land holdings ushered in by the Mexican revolution), seriously reducing women’s land rights: what was once considered patrimonio familiar, or a family resource, has now become the individual property of the predominantly male ejiditarios to dispose of as they see fit.

The Mexican case points to the strategic importance of the state as a mediator in establishing and maintaining women’s land rights. As women have gained in importance as a political constituency and become political actors in their own right, states have paid increasing importance to gender equality. In no small measure this is due to the strength of the women’s movement in Latin America, which is now a vibrant force throughout the region, cutting across class, race, ethnicity, and the rural-urban divide. The economic crisis that hit Latin America in the 1980s contributed to the spread of the women’s movement to the popular classes and to the growth of NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) staffed by leading feminists, who became the chief advocacy voice for gender rights in the 1990s. Deere and León stress the importance for consolidating these hard-won gains, of maintaining the unity of the women’s movement, and continuing the dialogue with the state, even when it proves unresponsive to women’s needs.

Maintaining unity in the women’s movement has become more difficult as feminism has spread and assumed a plurality of voices (see, e.g., Sonia Álvarez et al., “Encountering Latin American and Caribbean Feminisms” [Signs 28:537–80]). This can be seen in the tensions between gender and ethnic rights among indigenous women, with the rise of the indigenous movement in the 1990s. As Deere and León demonstrate, the emphasis of indigenous groups on collective land rights often serves to marginalize the individual rights of women; yet the need to maintain ethnic unity is so strong that women often subordinate their gender concerns to ethnic interests. A similar tension between gender and racial interests in land rights can be found among Afro-Latino communities in Latin America, and it would have been useful to hear from Deere and León in this regard. It would appear that the weakness of gender interests in these ethnic and racial communities is at least partly attributable to the failure of the mainstream women’s movement in Latin America to address the concerns of indigenous and Afro-Latin women and recognize a greater plurality of voices. It will be interesting to see how these tensions between gender interests and competing ethnic, racial, or class concerns is resolved by the Zapatista indigenous struggle in Chiapas, in which women have figured prominently, or among the strong class-based MST (Movimiento dos Tra-
balhadores Rurais Sem Terra), which has become the voice of the landless rural workers in 22 states of Brazil, neither of which is fully documented in the Deere and León volume.

Despite these minor shortcomings, this important book should be an essential tool in a variety of social science disciplines. It should also prove quite useful for courses in development, women’s studies, and Latin America generally.


Paul Statham
*University of Leeds*

To those of you who have the impression that the academy is increasingly dominated by fashionable decorative theories, where reputations and marketing ploys leave little space for understanding based on root and branch empirical analysis, I have the absolute pleasure in announcing the arrival of a modern day “classic” that bucks the trend. Mark Beissinger has set himself the task of explaining—no “postmodernist” shirking from causal analysis here—one of the most important and difficult research questions of the last century: How do we explain the collapse of the Soviet Union? Unpredicted and unforeseen by scholars and politicians in the West and East alike, Beissinger takes the truly revolutionary events of glasnost that have shaped our political world, not simply as a topic, but as a research question that challenges the interpretative powers of contemporary sociology.

Although it will not be possible for theorists of nationalism and post-Soviet studies to ignore Beissinger’s positions in their respective fields, the real aim and general sociological importance of this work derives from the interpretative and analytic framework that he puts forward for explaining the processes of political change. There is little room here to do anything other than briefly caricature the position advanced in this 500-page magnum opus.

Against what he sees as teleological and “post hoc” interpretations, Beissinger argues that it is necessary to tackle the difficult question of causal interaction between structure and agency to arrive at an explanation for the demise of the Soviet Union. The Beissinger approach puts collective actors and contentious events back at the center of analysis. In essence, he blends the contentious politics approach from social movement research—a close cousin of Sidney Tarrow’s “cycles of contention” (*Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy, 1965–1975* [Oxford University Press, 1989])—with a subtle appreciation of how nationalist ideas and beliefs can under specific conditions and opportunities supply
people with the cultural “tool-kits” to try and change their worlds by challenging the status quo. Beissinger’s position emphasizes the dynamic role that ideas, mobilized through collective action and inhering in contentious events, have not only as a challenge to the authority of the state, but also as an important structuring force that shapes future agency and contentious events. Mobilized events introduce contingencies, and thus have the potential to become a causal variable in the chain of subsequent actions: “As the constraints of order weaken, the clustering and linkage of contentious events themselves can provide a structurelike patterning of action that can gain a particular weight and alter expectations about the possibilities for future action, thereby facilitating further agency. In this way, events can come to act as part of their own causal structure” (p. 17).

Taken at face value, this may seem like another linguistic somersault or thinly disguised tautology for conflating structure and agency. However, what is particularly compelling about Beissinger’s approach is that, taking a cue from Margaret Archer rather than Anthony Giddens, the dualism between agency and structure is maintained as an analytic construct. Instead of making actors either the “masters” or alternatively the “puppets” of their destinies, this allows sufficient space for explaining through detailed empirical evidence gathered on specific events, at which times and under which circumstances collective agency shapes institutional and structural change. Thus the possibilities of alternative outcomes are not simply precluded from the outset by a deterministic interpretative framework. Of course, the topic of the study means that for the most part we are dealing with an exceptional historical period of high contention, and a situation whereby people either mobilized challenges, or experienced the challenges of others, through an unfolding series of events that transformed politics, social relationships, and structure of their society. However, when studying this “tide” of nationalism, as he calls it, and giving his own perspective on how ideas can produce change, Beissinger keeps the preexisting structural constraints, institutional constraints, and event-specific influences that shape these framing processes firmly in view, thus he avoids some of the indeterminacy and post hoc narrative “storytelling” that is common to many studies of framing and political change.

Special mention ought to be made of the multiple methods which Beissinger has applied to bring out qualitative and quantitative data that informs us about the unfolding of the process of political change. Protest event analysis is the central plank, but Beissinger shows how this tool can be most fruitfully utilized, and at the same time can link the macro- and microlevels. Again there is too little space here to do justice to the magnificent effort in gathering original and varied data sources. Comfortable, assertive, and stylish in shifting between theoretical inquiry and grounded empirical analysis, the author proves he has sufficient sociological imagination to pull off this staggering feat.
In the scholarly literature on postsocialism that has focused on party politics, macroeconomic reforms, and in general has been wedded to a view from above, a book such as Christiane Olivo’s is a welcome fresh breeze. Olivo studies the East German political scene of the 1980s and 1990s from the perspective of those civil initiatives that did not make the headlines, that might be viewed as small-scale, local, and limited in their effects, and whose representatives were not star intellectuals.

Olivo convincingly demonstrates that these movements deserve attention for theoretical and historical reasons. First, they are practical experiments in “deliberative democracy,” a so far mostly abstract political theory, inspired by Jurgen Habermas’s call for democracy based on communicative rationality. Such theories provide a critical response both to the overused concept of civil society in academia and to the practice of liberal democracy that is largely restricted to occasional voting and decisions made on the basis of opinion polls. Olivo agrees with the need to supplement parliamentary democracy with associations spontaneously formed by lay citizens to solve concrete problems through public deliberation. For her, the process or by-product of deliberative democracy (the creation of an educated and engaged citizenry) is just as important, if not more so, than its intended final product (a decision).

Second, these movements were instrumental in bringing Erich Honecker’s regime down in 1989. Setting the historical record straight in such a fashion is especially important in the case of German unification, where, even more than in the case of other former socialist countries, the transition has been explained more in terms of exporting and teaching democracy than in terms of building it. Olivo’s recall of Habermas’s characterization of the revolutions of 1989 as displaying “a total lack of ideas that are either innovative or oriented toward the future” and that they did nothing else but “caught up with Western liberal democracy” (p. 2) goes a long way to illustrate this paradigm.

It is fascinating that Habermas then becomes simultaneously the target and the tool of Olivo’s research. She argues that theories of participatory democracy need to be institutionalized in order to understand the emergence, success, or failure of deliberative democratic projects such as the citizen movements in East Germany. That is, one must analyze the level of informality, the nature of the state’s relationship to these associations, and their integration into the structures of representative democracy. The citizen movements emerged in 1989 from a variety of initiatives working for peace, the environment, human rights, and women’s equality. By
pursuing an alternative sociality based on authenticity, nonviolence, and social responsibility, they helped carve out spaces for independent action. While the infrastructure they created came in handy in the dangerous weeks preceding Honecker’s resignation, allowing millions to take to the streets, these movements vanished after the unification.

The citizen movements successfully forced the state to negotiate with them the change in power in such deliberative political forums as round tables and citizen committees. Once, however elections were initiated, there emerged tremendous pressure to integrate into liberal representative politics. While this process eventually took place in all former socialist countries, in the former German Democratic Republic the competition from established and well-funded West German parties and politicians was painfully overwhelming. Alliance 90 was formed by three major citizens’ movements with the purpose of standing up to the Western rivals in the 1990 elections. With most resources transferred to parliamentary politics and with the disappointing election results, the institutional foundations of deliberative democracy quickly crumbled. The ensuing analysis by Olivo shows that certain institutional conditions have to be met consistently if such movements are to survive, such as a high level of participation (which is a matter of both inclusiveness and interest), having access to the state to avoid marginalization, the political experience of activists, and a certain harmony between the agendas of the deliberative activists and the voting public.

Despite the fact that these innovative movements have by now completely disappeared (or have been absorbed by West German organizations) Olivo does not allow the reader to draw the conclusion that the citizen movements were in vain and that their decline was inevitable. However, among the overwhelmingly numerous, albeit well-researched events, one is at a loss to find when and where the demise of Alliance 90 could have been avoided. Even more important, sociologists will be left wondering about the social, and not just the institutional, conditions of deliberative democracy. Whose interests did the citizen movements represent and whose could they not? What social groups benefited economically and morally from the victory of West German parties and politicians? Finally, what is the role of social differentiation in the demise of deliberative democracy, which must surely be more labor intensive in times of increasing social heterogeneity and inequality? Overall, nevertheless, scholars studying Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, political sociologists, and activists interested in alternative forms of political engagement will find much useful insight in this volume.

Joan Busfield
University of Essex

Creating Mental Illness is a thought-provoking and important book. Drawing on and consolidating the ideas of a range of authors, it challenges the existing use of the term mental illness and the psychiatric ideas and practices on which this usage is based.

The key issue Horwitz addresses is the expansive, and in his eyes frequently inappropriate, use of the concept of mental illness. There are, he argues, valid mental disorders. Such disorders involve symptoms that cluster together and, crucially, stem from some underlying psychological dysfunction—that is, some internal mechanism that is unable to perform its function. The psychoses generally meet this requirement and are properly and appropriately called mental illnesses. In many cases, however, the symptoms of mental disorder are expectable responses to stressful situations and there is no psychological dysfunction involved. It is normal to be distressed if your marriage breaks down or your child is killed; the symptoms generated in these contexts are to be expected and do not indicate any psychological dysfunction or, consequently, any mental disorder. It is only if such symptoms are very severe, or if they persist when they might be expected to have disappeared, that they indicate some psychological dysfunction. Similarly much social deviance is not indicative of mental disorder, since it does not usually arise from any psychological dysfunction (though sometimes it will).

How has this expansive but highly problematic use of the concept of mental disorder come about? It has arisen, Horwitz argues, because of the emergence of “diagnostic psychiatry,” that was ushered in by the development of the third edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III) in 1980. The DSM-III and its successors serve as the linchpin of the diagnostic psychiatry that replaced the dynamic psychiatry of the earlier era, whose ideas had informed previous versions of the DSM. The new DSM emphasized reliability not validity, and differentiated distinct disease entities in terms of their symptoms (but not their causes)—symptoms often abstracted from their social context. Categorical precision was designed to strengthen the scientific standing of psychiatry, as well as meet the requirements of third-party payers, the demands of advocacy groups, and the interests of pharmaceutical companies. Since the research psychiatrists who developed the DSM-III also decided to encompass the full range of disorders encountered by mental health professionals in clinical contexts—a range that dynamic psychiatry, with its focus on the continuity of the normal and the pathological, had done much to foster—the result was the incorporation as disease entities of a very broad range of disorders,
regardless of whether they fit the categorical model of the DSM-III. This expansive, inclusive use of the concept of mental disorder has been further reinforced by epidemiological work in which the measures of mental disorder in community settings are exclusively symptom-based and operate without any concern for the social context of reported behaviors and feelings (or any need for the individual to be seeking help).

Subsequent chapters develop the arguments further by exploring the structuring of symptoms according to the cultural context, the biological and social causes of mental illness, and different treatments. Though this is a well-trodden territory, Horwitz’s effort to delineate a narrower application for the term mental illness is greatly welcomed, as are his detailed explorations and analyses of the development and impact of the DSM-III, the factors underpinning the paradigm shift within psychiatry, the role of epidemiological studies, and the structuring of distress. There are, however, problems. While the focus on psychological dysfunction and expectable behavior, grounded in the work of J. C. Wakefield, has attractions, it does not entirely solve the boundary problems surrounding concepts of mental illness, as Horwitz himself notes.

Second, Horwitz gives central place in his analysis to the DSM-III and subsequent versions. Certainly the DSM-III has been important, but whether its development and the role of diagnosis are quite as critical as he suggests is debatable; arguably, too, the more usual term “biomedical” is still a more useful shorthand for characterizing the psychiatry of recent decades. Moreover, the role of the pharmaceutical industry in shaping psychiatric ideas and practice needs more discussion. In all this, comparison with developments outside the United States would have helped to illuminate the analysis.

Third, Horwitz’s account of the historical development of psychiatry is not entirely satisfactory. His emphasis on the role of the brain and biological processes in 19th-century accounts of the causes of mental disorder simplifies what were often much more complex and diverse accounts in which environmental factors did frequently feature. Moreover, the treatment of “nerves,” neurasthenia, and hysteria that predated dynamic psychiatry played a more important role in encouraging expansion of the concept of mental illness than he allows.

Nonetheless, Horwitz enters this controversial territory with confidence, conviction, and clarity. His ideas deserve a wider audience than this academic presentation is likely to receive; it is to be hoped that they will be publicized more widely.

Frank Furedi
University of Kent at Canterbury

Ever since McLuhan’s pathbreaking work (The Medium Is the Message [Bantam, 1960]), there has been an extensive discussion of how formats and frames shape mass media content. David L. Altheide takes this discussion substantially further and in a more sociological direction. For some time now, Altheide has been in the forefront of the debate on the role of the media in the construction of the problem of fear. Working in the social constructionist tradition, the main focus of the author in this book is the exploration of the problem frame that dominates media news production.

In contrast to the emphases of other contributions to the sociology of fear, which examine specific subjects, such as the fear of crime (e.g., Kenneth F. Ferraro, Fear of Crime: Interpreting Victimization Risk. [State University of New York Press, 1995]), Altheide attempts to make sense of how fears in general persist in public life. So the subject of the book is the discourse of fear, which the author defines “as the pervasive communication, symbolic awareness, and expectation that danger and risk are a central feature of the effective environment” (p. 41). Altheide believes that the entertainment formats of mass media and popular culture, “along with several generations’ familiarity and assumptions about media use in everyday life have contributed to this development” (p. 42). However, this argument is not a simple restatement of the importance of the media’s impact on the public imagination. He offers a subtle analysis of the problem frame through which ideas about fear are transmitted. He represents the media’s problem frame as a “secular alternative to a morality play” (p. 47). But he adds that unlike “morality plays in which the audience is reminded of eternal threats and truths, the problem frame features everyday life filled with problem-generating fear” (p. 49).

Altheide is particularly persuasive in situating fear within the wider process of change. Although his argument that information technology changes the symbol systems through which the public makes sense of fear requires greater elaboration, Altheide provides a useful conceptual framework for making sense of the expansion of fear in contemporary societies. Altheide makes a very useful distinction between what he characterises as the “parallel use of fear in the 1980s” and the “nonparallel use of fear in the 1990s” (pp. 161–64). The former refers to the media’s use of fear in parallel with specific events such as a crime. The latter refers to a shift from a specific to a more general condition of fear communicated by newspapers. The adoption of a nonparallel use of fear has promoted a more general and pervasive disposition towards fear and as a result “we experience more of our lives through a lens of fear” (p. 98). Paradoxically,
fear is seldom discussed in its own right. But in an atmosphere of generalized anxiety the very discussion of issues as diverse as race and children contain the implication of fear.

The conclusion drawn by the author from his analysis is that “fear is a perspective or an orientation to the world rather than ‘fear of something’” (p. 178). This conclusion is rigorously supported by the research on media sources explored by Altheide. However, there is a missing link. Altheide’s analysis of the media does not account for what he sees as the transformation of fear into a “dominant public perspective” (p. 3). An explanation of this development would require an account of how the media’s problem frame is mediated through cultural flows. Of course the author is sensitive toward the influence of culture in the shaping of contemporary fears. He notes for example, that the contemporary valorization of the status of the victim is underpinned by a “cultural context that promotes fear as a common definition of the environment” (p. 92). All too briefly, the author tantalizingly raises the idea of “fear market,” where competing claims makers and victims vie with one another to win popular acceptance for their version of what needs to be feared. Altheide also points the way in which “fear has emerged as a framework for developing identities and for engaging in social life” (p. 3). However, these useful insights into the wider cultural processes that promote the institutionalization of fear need to be brought into a more explicit relationship with the author’s exemplary analysis of the role of the media. Altheide, himself recognizes that his work calls for a “broader sociology of fear” (p. 177), and his work makes an important contribution to this project. Its main strength is its compelling analysis of the “media logic” and entertainment formats that has led to the construction of the contemporary fear discourse. It is an analysis that has the merit of evolving further through new research on fear.


E. Doyle McCarthy
*Fordham University*

The publication of William Reddy’s book comes at an important moment in the recent resurgence of emotion studies in the social and psychological sciences, roughly the last three decades. The first phase was taken up with the problem of defining and conceptualizing the emotions, leading to the production of a large number of works in the psychological and social sciences. Quite predictably—and following the particular cultural logic of our own modern civilization with its mind-body dualism and its irresolute struggle of reason and emotion—the emotions have been studied
in these fields as either “cultural” or “biological” phenomena. If the emotions are principally biological events, then human emotionality varies neither historically nor culturally, at least not in fundamental ways. But if it can be demonstrated that emotions vary remarkably from society to society, then culture matters and the principal contexts for their study and their variations are the cultural systems and social worlds where they are experienced and known, the particular political and religious systems, the various discourses, the collective practices, and the forms of selfhood that prevail among particular groups and societies.

This latter approach to human emotionality introduced something entirely new into the lexicon of emotion studies: the theory of emotions as social constructs—“emotion is culture”—an argument developed by the ethnographer Benedicte Grima and cited in Reddy’s preface (p. ix). According to social constructionism, the emotions can be studied as collective ways of acting and being shaped by the social circumstances (social structure) and culture of a particular society, group, or community. Its most prominent feature is an emphasis on the cognitive and cultural features of emotion, an emphasis it shares with many cognitive psychologists working in emotions and with those identified with the social constructionist movement in psychology—Kenneth Gergen, James Averill, and Rom Harré—as well as with a number of works in cultural anthropology and philosophy.

One principal outcome of these studies had been an emerging history of emotions or, more accurately stated by Reddy, the discovery that “emotions have a kind of history” (p. x), as scholars from medievalists to modernists have come upon various revolutions in the domain of feelings and judgments about feelings, their cultivation, control, and expression. As Reddy makes abundantly clear, a history of emotions is particularly suited to address questions of how precisely and in what ways cultures of sentiment and emotion—standards, ideas, precepts concerning how to feel and what to feel and what feelings mean—and emotional experiences themselves actually change and what these changes signify. More important—and this is, I think, the book’s primary achievement—a history of emotions takes up issues closed off by (ahistorical) constructionist arguments, such as how to evaluate and judge the emotional “regimes” that societies impose on their members.

Here is a very brief overview of some of Reddy’s arguments. Engaging the recent work of cognitive psychologists, particularly the findings that emotions operate as “overlearned cognitive habits,” Reddy examines the impact and importance of anthropological studies and their arguments for cross-cultural variations in the types of emotional lexicons and emotional practices. Using both bodies of work, Reddy presses his own questions—questions about the constraints to which all emotional cultures might be subject. In this way he opens up questions about the universal features of emotions that have been closed off by recent constructionist studies. If emotional change and difference—so central to the construc-
tionist argument—is more than mere randomness, “it must result from interaction between our emotional capacities and the unfolding of historical circumstances” (p. 45). There is also, he argues, a “political incoherence” to constructionism and one that also leaves unresolved questions of human freedom. An overly constructed emotion theory also disregards political questions about individual desire and choice, political questions about the repercussions of particular political forms (terror, repression), and their relation to individual feeling and emotion states.

Reddy’s historical method—one that focuses on changes in the emotions and in sociocultural climates that foster or suppress emotions—addresses these questions by using studies of Revolutionary France and its “sentimentalism” to demonstrate that investigations into “emotional liberty” and suffering can be undertaken. He entertains with a refreshing frankness questions about the (collective) alienation of emotion and issues of human agency and freedom by examining the ways that people actually translate (“navigate”) emotional cultures and how these cultures may make navigation and self-determination easier or more difficult. In each of these ways, Reddy opens up a new phase in the interdisciplinary field of emotion studies by raising questions and providing some answers as well about (collective) emotional change and its limits. This is a challenging book for scholars in a range of fields from social psychology to comparative historical studies and for those doing work on emotions and social movements.


Harold J. Bershady
University of Pennsylvania

From the late 1940s to the late 1960s, Talcott Parsons’s works were studied in graduate sociology programs here and abroad, and he was acclaimed as America’s, indeed the West’s, leading sociological theorist. But after a decade of intense ideological criticism, a virtual silence descended on Parsons in the United States, and a generation of American sociologists, now under the age of 45, has had little exposure to his theory of social action. In the early 1990s, however, this silence was broken and interest has been growing in Parsons’s work.

The book under review is an example of this interest. The editor notes several studies of the last decade in the United States and Europe on Parsons's theory of social action and believes something will be retrieved of this complex and far-reaching theoretical enterprise.

Perhaps so. In any event, the editor provides a useful overview of the theory of action aimed at redressing gaps in knowledge that currently
exist. This is followed by 10 essays on aspects of Parsons’s work. Although not divided as such, and covering a wide range of subjects, the essays are grouped approximately into three parts that discuss Parsons’s early, middle, and late work.

In the first essay, Lawrence J. Nichols attempts to unearth strains on the young Parsons at Harvard that may have influenced him to omit a chapter on Simmel in the *Structure of Social Action*. Nichols’s discussion is interesting as intellectual history and for the glimpse of departmental politics at Harvard in the 1930s. However, the essay suffers from the several “it could or must have been” sorts of reasons given for Parsons’s decision, which are too presumptive to be fully persuasive.

Max Weber influenced Parsons’s theoretical work throughout his long career. However, by comparing Parsons’s efforts to combat fascism with those of Erik Voegelin, William J. Buxton, and William Rehorick show that Weberian thought served Parsons as a practical guide as well. Voegelin approached the issue from a *Geisteswissenschaftliche* standpoint, whereas Parsons, in more Weberian fashion (considered by Voegelin to be positivistic), endeavored to bring the resources of all the social sciences to bear. Buxton and Rehorick find Weber’s influence operating in Parsons’s career-long effort “to generate practical guidelines for the social sciences” (p. 106). The essay is interesting for what it says about Parsons and for studies it implies could be made of theoretical perspectives in the practical engagements of other social sciences.

Bruce Wearne compares the analytical and generalizing mode of Parsons’s thinking with the descriptive, historical mode of Norbert Elias’s. The two kinds of approaches to social subject matter have been at odds for at least a century and a half, and despite the greater knowledge each has gained of the other over the years, they remain essentially deaf to each other’s arguments. Why these differences have never been resolved, despite their many able proponents, is a puzzle that, as Wearne observes, is threaded through much of social science. This thoughtful essay invites investigation into the historical and cultural sources of these long-standing oppositions in the social sciences.

Four essays discuss Parsons’s early functionalist phase. Bernard Barber dubs *The Social System* “the second project” of Parsons’s work (after *The Structure of Social Action*) and sketches a few theoretical sources and developments of the social system concept. Bryan S. Turner argues that Parsons’s analysis of regulative processes of social systems reflects America of 1950 but is of problematic value in today’s postmodern world. The dynamism and complexities of social life today, Turner says, far exceed the grasp of Parsons’s formulations. (Turner’s argument is strongly, although briefly, challenged by Neil Smelser, in the foreward to the book, who suggests uses to which the pattern variables, particularism/universalism and achievement/ascription, as well as structural differentiation, can be put in analyzing contemporary social developments and conflicts.) Jonathan H. Turner attempts, in an ambitious and programmatic essay,
to salvage the functionalism of Parsons’s early/middle period by clarifying certain points of its premises, particularly “system needs,” and by laying out many sorts of gives-and-takes among micro-, meso-, and macroforces within the parameters of such needs. Stephen Fuchs discusses Niklas Luhmann more than Parsons and his own conception of networks more than either of the other two. He concentrates mainly on the Social System, but his discussion is perfunctory and misleading, perhaps because it is so meager. The primary aim of the essay is to argue for an integration of network analysis with Luhmann’s system theory, for this, asserts Fuchs, will be truer to the fluid, temporal quality of social life. As is also true of Jonathan Turner’s essay, the brevity of Fuchs’s essay permits only a suggestive, largely declarative exposition of his thesis.

The remaining three essays are, I think, the most creative in the book. Victor Lidz provides the clearest exposition of Parsons’s media theory that I have read. Following this, and in convergence with Noam Chomsky’s theory of language, Lidz develops the thesis that many formal properties of language—generativity, signification, representation, transformability—apply to the media of interchange of all the parts of the action system, those of mind, personality, social system, and culture. Moreover, because language is the master medium of social action, its resources and properties are likely central in facilitating processes of social integration and differentiation. It should thus be possible, in comparative perspective, to analyze language use in records and documents, to contrive a gauge of such processes. This is a bold, systematic thesis that opens new directions for theoretical and empirical research.

Uta Gerhardt analyzes and clarifies the development of Parsons’s concept of societal community, a later theoretical development in his work that has not been well attended but is of practical importance for present-day concerns. Her analysis begins where the Social System left off, continues through the theory of media and, by examining political and ethnic conflict, explores processes of structural and cultural differentiation and dedifferentiation. En route, she astutely appraises other commentaries of Parsons’s work, corrects many misconceptions, and concludes with a brief, but pregnant, discussion of the “evolutionary-cybernetic” concept of societal community, as she puts it, for understanding globalization and civil society. It is a bracing essay.

Mark Gould proposes that a general empirical sociological theory can significantly contribute to the resolution of important normative questions. His bête noir is essentially neoclassical, libertarian thought from whose utilitarian premises only limited moral arguments can be drawn. He gives, as an example, the normative arguments in colleges and universities policies regulating consensual sexual relations between employees and students. Should mutual consent be the guiding principle? Should understanding of how the psychodynamics of transference in teaching affects judgment be a consideration? And what of conflicts of interests between the parties, can they be eliminated? What are the moral values specific
to the regulation of consensual relations between employees and college students? In discussing these issues, Gould makes a sharp and important distinction between the justification and legitimation of such relations. Drawing on the early normative theory Parsons developed in *The Structure of Social Action*, Gould argues that a consensual policy must take into account the social values that legitimate activities, including consensual sexual relations, within colleges and universities. These values, he believes, are the values proper to the identity of colleges and universities, namely, the cognitive development of its students. Given these values, the construction of legitimate regulations between employees and students can be achieved that will simultaneously uphold the identity of the university. In a heretofore unexplored way, Mark Gould has opened to us a rich resource in action theory for the sociology of law. The book, in sum, is uneven, but the really good essays are uniquely good, and I recommend them to all sociologists who have an interest in theory.